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Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal




The equal protection clause, ambiguous in its language and its history,' has
over the last three decades been transformed from the "last resort of constitu-
tional arguments' 2 into a significant force in shaping the American response to
the continuing challenge of a pluralistic society. This transformation, achieved
primarily by the Warren Court,3 has been effected through development of a
multi-tiered theory of equal protection. Beginning with Koremalsu v. United
States,4 the Court has applied heightened scrutiny to those legislative schemes
involving suspect classifications 5 or fundamental rights.6 If the legislation in-
volves neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right, the Court ap-
plies minimal scrutiny, asking only whether the legislative scheme bears a
rational relationship to a permissible state interest.7 If one of the factors trig-
gering heightened scrutiny is present, however, the Court demands that the
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like to thank David Bryden,
Dan Farber, Gary Peller, Geof Stone, and Ted White for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this Article, and Eve R. Borenstein and Marla M. Ziegler for their research assistance.
1. Compare R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 3 (1977) (legislative history of fourteenth amendment indicates narrowly defined
rights protected by amendment) with Bickel, The Original Understanding and The Segregation Decision,
69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955) (fourteenth amendment invites application based on current "moral and
material state of the nation"); Farber & Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment,
1 CONST. COMMENTARY 235 (1984); and Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's
History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651-59, 705 (1979) (Berger interpretation of fourteenth amendment defines
protected rights too narrowly).
2. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
3. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (invalidating state poll tax
on equal protection grounds); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (invalidating state legislative appor-
tionment scheme on equal protection grounds); Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (strik-
ing down racially segregated school system as violation of equal protection). But see Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (Burger Court's application of heightened scrutiny to gender discrimination);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (Burger Court's application of heightened scrutiny
to discrimination on basis of alienage).
4. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
5. Suspect classifications entitled to strict judicial scrutiny include race, Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971), and national
origin, Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480-81 (1954). "Quasi-suspect" classifications, which are
subjected to "quasi-strict" scrutiny, include gender, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), and ille-
gitimacy, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968). See generally Gunther, Foreword- In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: .4 Modelfor Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1972) (analysis of Burger Court's equal protection decisions). For the purposes of this Article, the
difference between strict and quasi-strict scrutiny is not important, and the broader phrase "heightened
scrutiny" will be used.
6. Fundamental rights include voting, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966),
interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969), and privacy, Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
7. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 111 (1979) (upholding mandatory retirement age for
foreign service personnel); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-87 (1970) (upholding $250
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government show both a more significant governmental interest and a tighter
fit between the means and the end.8 The Court thus has adopted a practice of
selective judicial activism, identifying suspect classifications and fundamental
rights as contexts that trigger a more activist stance.
The Court has never clearly articulated the purposes of heightened scrutiny
nor sufficiently explained the nexus between the factors that make a classifica-
tion suspect and the need for both a stronger governmental interest and a
tighter fit.9 One major problem with the current doctrine of selective judicial
activism in the equal protection area is a lack of congruence between the justi-
fications offered for context-specific judicial activism and the identification of
specific contexts that trigger that activism. This problem takes two forms.
Either the justification is persuasive, but the contextual limits are too narrowly
circumscribed, '0 or the contextual limits are broad but are not justified in con-
stitutional terms.1 1
This Article is an attempt to explain and defend selective judicial activism
while showing that the only persuasive justification for such selectivity necessi-
tates changing the current lines of selection.' 2 I will argue that: (1) the purpose
of heightened scrutiny in equal protection cases is to identify those instances in
which class-based prejudice or indifference has likely influenced the legislative
outcome; (2) the "suspect classifications" doctrine often used by the Court in
the contexts of race and gender is fundamentally inconsistent with this purpose
and should be replaced by a "disfavored class" doctrine; and (3) extension of a
"disfavored class" doctrine to race and gender would change results in two
significant areas by validating most affirmative action programs and subjecting
neutral statutes with a disparate impact to heightened scrutiny.
monthly welfare payment limit); Railway Express Agency v. New Yor, 336 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1949)
(upholding state law prohibiting advertising on some but not all vehicles).
8. The requirement is captured in a variety of phrases, but the Court most often requires either a
"necessary" relationship to a "compelling interest," Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 634, or a "sub-
stantial" relationship to an "important interest." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197.
9. Several Justices have criticized the heightened scrutiny approach for this failure. Chief Justice
Burger has charged that "the Court, in a rather casual way, has articulated the code phrase 'suspect
classifications' as though it embraced a reasoned constitutional concept." In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717,
730 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1973) (White, J.,
concurring) (noting that Court's "assessment of the weight and value of the interest involved" affects
treatment of government interest); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("decisions in the field of equal protection defy ... easy
categorization").
10. John Ely, for example, persuasively suggests that "process defects" are the only legitimate justifi-
cation for heightened judicial review of legislative action. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 135-79 (1980). Ely's theory, however, stops short of validating affirmative action and ques-
tioning neutral statutes that disproportionately affect minorities.
11. Owen Fiss, for example, argues for many of the contextual limits suggested in this Article, see
Fiss, Groups and the EqualProtection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 146-47 (1976), but fails to justify
his theory on constitutional grounds. See infra text accompanying notes 81 to 83 (criticizing Fiss
theory).
12. Cf. Benedict, To Secure These Rights: Rights, Democracy, and Judicial Review in the Anglo-Amer-
ican Constitutional Heritage, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 69 (1981) (characterizing much recent constitutional
scholarship as an attempt "to find a principled basis for [judicial] activism--something that would
permit its continuation but would restrain Justices from simply imposing their personal social values on
the country in the, fashion of a super-legislature").
[Vol. 73:89
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I. THE PURPOSE OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY: Two REJECTED MODELS
Heightened scrutiny of laws involving suspect classifications might be
designed to serve any of three goals potentially furthered by the equal protec-
tion clause: (1) the prohibition of certain statutory techniques or "legislative
outcomes" (the color-blind model); (2) the prohibition of certain substantive
states of affairs or "real world outcomes" (the substance model); or (3) the
prevention or remedy of certain defects in the legislative process (the process
model). I will argue that neither the first nor the second model is wholly de-
fensible and that the Court has, in fact, largely adopted the third model. I will
then argue that the Court and most other advocates of the third model have
mistaken its implications.
A. THE COLOR-BLIND MODEL
The color-blind model condemns "the government's deliberate use of race
as a criterion of selection."1 3 The model is derived primarily from two prem-
ises: a historical interpretation of the Civil War amendments as designed
largely to combat the use of race as a selection criterion, and a moral or polit-
ical conviction that "one should be judged not as a member of a particular
racial group, but as an individual."' 4 Additionally, the color-blind model has
been defended as a neutral constraint on governmental action that does not
require courts to make value judgments thought to be outside the competence
of the judiciary.' 5 There are two significant implications of the color-blind
model. First, since the use of race as a selection criterion triggers heightened
scrutiny, any governmental classification based on race-whether benign or
harmful-is presumptively unconstitutional. 6 Second, since only the deliber-
ate use of race triggers heightened scrutiny, neutral statutes with a dispropor-
tionate impact on racial minorities are subject only to the rational basis test
and thus are almost always held to be constitutional.' 7
None of the justifications offered for the color-blind model is persuasive as
an abstract matter, and a review of the Supreme Court's treatment of the equal
protection clause suggests that, despite Justice Harlan's eloquent defense of the
color-blind model in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,'8 the Court has never
13. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 548
(1977). For a good description of the color-blind model, see Fiss, supra note 11, at 118-23. See also
Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHi. L. REv. 775,
783-92 (1979) (characterizing 20 years of Supreme Court equal protection decisions from 1954 to 1974
as supporting a color-blind theory).
14. Perry, supra note 13, at 540, 549; see also Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIo ST. L.J 131,
140-41 (1981) (fourteenth amendment rights are personal).
15. See infra notes 35 to 46 and accompanying text (arguing that color-blind model does not effec-
tively constrain judicial discretion).
16. See Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (racial classifications per
se require strict scrutiny) and cases cited therein.
17. See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 71-73 (1980) (disproportionate impact of state's at-large
electoral scheme alone not violation of fourteenth amendment); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 273-75 (1979) (disproportionate impact of employment preference system for veterans not
violation of fourteenth amendment); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-46 (1976) (disproportion-
ate racial impact of District of Columbia police applicant examination not violation of fourteenth
amendment).
18. Justice Harlan wrote:
1984]
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adopted this model and has in fact taken positions that cannot be reconciled
with it.
1. The Historical Justification
If one makes the controversial assumption that the fourteenth amendment's
history ought to be relevant to modem courts' interpretation of that amend-
ment, 19 the historical evidence does not support the color-blind model. The
framers of the fourteenth amendment were, in fact, color-conscious in the
broadest and most laudable sense of the word. In light of the Civil War, the
thirteenth amendment, and the Black Codes, it is indisputable that the framers
were motivated primarily, if not solely, by a desire to remedy the desperate
plight of newly freed blacks.20 The references in both the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and the fifteenth amendment to "previous condition of servitude" also
suggest the color-consciousness of those who framed both these enactments
and the fourteenth amendment; only blacks had been in a condition of servi-
tude. The debates on both the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act
focused on the scope of the rights conferred on the newly-freed blacks: propo-
nents attempted to meet the fears of opponents by assuring them of the limited
objectives of the bills.21 Moreover, the 1866 Civil Rights Act, enacted by the
same Congress, explicitly conferred on all citizens the same rights as those
"enjoyed by white citizens,"22 suggesting an intention to protect blacks.23 Fi-
nally, the earliest-and thus most significant 24-judicial interpretation of the
equal protection clause highlights the color-consciousness of that era. Justice
Miller, writing for himself and four other Justices in the Slaughter-House
Cases,25 stated that he "doubt[ed] very much whether any action of a State not
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are
equal before the law.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
19. Compare R. BERGER, supra note 1 (legislative history of fourteenth amendment commands that
intention of framers be binding on the Court) andBork, Neutral Princples and Some FirstAmendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 17 (1971) (emphasizing importance of framers' intent in finding existence of
constitutional rights) with Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding, 69 B.U. L.
REv. 204, 205 (1980) (concluding that theory of constitutional interpretation based on framers' intent is
untenable) and Ely, Constitutional Interpretation: 1is Allure and lmpossibiliy, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 400
(1978) (concluding that Constitution was meant to be interpreted by each age in a contemporary
context).
20. See III C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 265 (1922) (fourteenth
amendment designed to make blacks the political equals of whites). Even those commentators who
deplore the present Court's unwarranted expansion of the fourteenth amendment do not deny-in fact
reaffirm-that the amendment was designed primarily as a protection for blacks. Their claim is merely
that it was not intended as the broad protection read into it by the modem Court. See R. BEROER,
supra note 1, at 166-83 (arguing that equal protection clause conferred only limited rights on blacks).
21. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 466-
71 (1975) (excerpts from debates illustrate great concern over nature of rights being conferred on newly
freed blacks); Bickel, supra note 1, at 1, 40-46 (same).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1982) (devolved from 1866 Civil Rights Act).
23. But see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 289 (1976) (legislative history
reveals that Civil Rights Act of 1866 viewed "by its opponents and supporters.., as applying to the
civil rights of whites as well as nonwhites").
24. See, e.g., R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES 11 (1982) (it is a "canon of interpretation that contem-
poraneous constructions carry great weight").
25. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account
of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. '26
He found that clause to be "clearly a provision for that race and that emer-
gency . *"27
It is, of course, unsurprising that the framers of the amendment did not
adopt, even implicitly, the color-blind model; they did not, and could not, con-
template any context in which their color-conscious desire to assist blacks
might come into conflict with the results mandated by a color-blind model.
The historical justification for the color-blind model thus founders on the same
shoals that most such analyses do: the 19th-century society and political cli-
mate was so immeasurably different from our own that many of the issues that
concern us never occurred to the framers. 28 Proponents of the historical justifi-
cation thus must either accept as constitutionally valid color-conscious legisla-
tion designed to help rather than harm blacks or abandon the historical
perspective as a tool of constitutional interpretation. In either event, the justi-
fication fails to support the color-blind model.
2. The Individualist Perspective
The color-blind model also relies on an individualist perspective to reject all
classifications based on race. The individualist perspective is based on the
principle that one ought to be judged as an individual rather than as a member
of a group. An illustration of the tautological nature of this argument may be
found in an elaboration of the philosophical difference between classification
and denotation.
To classify is to identify by specifying class membership conditions; to de-
note is to identify by name.29 Classification thus uses general terms, or predi-
cates, while denotation uses singular terms, or names. It is possible for two
different classifications or predicates to pick out the same individuals: the
classification "the first three prime numbers" and the (different) classification
"the first three natural numbers" both pick out the numbers one, two, and
three. Either classification is satisfactory if our purpose is merely to direct at-
tention to the numbers one, two, and three. If, however, we wish to avoid
classifying at all, we must list or name the referents individually: "one,"
"two," and "three." It is not possible for the same linguistic formulation to
classify and to denote simultaneously; it is not possible for a word to be simul-
taneously a predicate or general term and a name or singular term. 30
26. Id at 81.
27. Id (emphasis added).
28. One response to this challenge is the hermeneutic tradition, in which the historian attempts to
understand historical actors in the context of their own understandings of their world. See R. COL-
LINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY (1946) (historical thinking focuses on texts "that describe not what
is now being thought but what was thought by. . . historians at some time in the past"). The problem
with this approach is that it utterly fails to serve interpretivism's underlying goals of determinacy and
judicial restraint and thus denies the validity of its own history-oriented approach. See Tushnet, Fol-
lowing the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interreivism and Neutral Princeples, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781,
799-802 (1983) (discussing this "dilemma of interpretivism").
29. See generally R. CARNAP, MEANING AND NECESSITY (1947); Black, A Translation of Frege's
Uebersinn Und Bedeutung (Sense and Reference), 57 PHIL. REV. 207 (1948).
30. Cf. Ely, Legislative andAdministrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1249-
50 (1970) (drawing semantic distinction between "a law limiting income tax exemptions for children to
1984]
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When this elaboration is applied to legislation, the problem with the individ-
ualist perspective becomes clearer. Legislation always uses the human ana-
logue of "the first three natural numbers" ("blacks"; "residents of
Minneapolis"; "law school applicants with LSATs above 650") and never the
human analogue of "one," "two," "three" ("Susan Jones," "Mary Smith," and
"Anne Doe"). 31 Because all legislation uses predicates, it cannot denote indi-
viduals. In other words, because the legislature does not-and presumably
cannot-pick out a person except by specifying the class membership condi-
tions of the groups to which that person belongs, it never treats the person as
an individual but always as a member of a group. The significance of the
distinction between classifying and denoting is that it is impossible for govern-
mental action that classifies to treat people also as individuals.
What, then, are we to make of the color-blind theorist's demand to be
treated as an individual? It cannot be a demand to be named rather than clas-
sified; I would suggest that it is, in fact, simply a demand to be differently
classified. An example may illustrate the point. Allan Bakke's32 complaint
was not that he was treated as a member of a group, but that he was treated as
a member of the wrong group. He wished to be treated as a member of the
group "applicants with grades and MCATs above a certain arbitrary level"
rather than as a member of the group "white applicants. '33 Thus, the individu-
alist argument is nothing more than a restatement of the basic premise of the
color-blind model that race is an impermissible basis on which to classify. The
individualist argument fails to explain, however, why MCAT score is a permis-
sible classificatory device and race is an impermissible one. 34 The argument,
standing alone, thus cannot justify the color-blind model.
3. Constraining Judicial Discretion
Advocates of the color-blind model often contend that any broader or more
flexible interpretation of the equal protection clause is both politically and
practically intolerable. Politically, all interpretivists agree that without strict
external constraints on the judiciary judges will substitute their values for
the children of Caucasians" and "a law granting the exemption to 'the children of Asger H. Aaboe,
Jerrit Aardewerk. ). I am indebted to Richard Eldridge for suggesting the numeric example
used in the text.
31. It may, in fact, be unconstitutional under the bill of attainder clause for the legislature to deal in
individuals rather than in classes. Cf. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977)
(statute singling out former President Nixon is not a bill of attainder because Nixon "constitute[s] a
legitimate class of one").
32. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
33. Id at 272-80. See Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REv.
955, 961 ("A claim to be treated on the basis of one's 'individual attributes' either is a disguised claim to
be treated as a member of the group possessed of one or more specified attributes or it is unintel-
ligible"); see also R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SEIOUSLY 227-28 (1977).
34. The argument that MCAT scores, unlike race, are related to individual merit, is equally falla-
cious. Neither race nor intellectual ability (the usual content of "merit") is the result of individual
effort, and thus the decision to consider the one but not the other must be based not on a moral theory
ofjust deserts but rather on a theory of social needs. SeeJ. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 102 (1971)
(natural endowment is "undeserved"); Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 137 (S.
Hampshire ed. 1978) (talent seen as irrelevant); Karst & Horowitz, supra note 33, at 962 ("[i]n speaking
of merit in a racial context, one. . . focuses on fulfilling social needs"); Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radical-
ism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. Rlv. 1103, 1163 (1983) (characterizing relative talent as a
"morally arbitrary" selection criterion).
[Vol. 73:89
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those of the legislature. Allowing judges to impose their own values is both
countermajoritarian, in that judges are not politically accountable, and incon-
sistent with a perceived need for principles of general applicability to generate
determinacy and predictability in the judicial process. 35 By limiting judges to
determining only whether the statutory classification scheme is sufficiently re-
lated to a legitimate end,36 the color-blind model of heightened scrutiny is said
to serve the purpose of constraining judicial discretion. Thus, the argument
goes, the color-blind model confines judicial review to scrutiny of the means
rather than of the ends of legislation.
In fact, the color-blind model does not serve these stated goals, as Alan
Freeman has convincingly shown.37 Freeman reasons that the irrationality of
race-conscious statutes cannot be demonstrated without assuming either that
segregation is itself an illegitimate end or that "racial classifications are almost
always unrelated to any valid governmental purpose. . .. -38 Neither assump-
tion can be made "except in the context of a particular historical situation,"
39
and thus judges must engage in the very historical, color-conscious analysis
that the color-blind model seeks to preclude. For example, a school principal's
decision to segregate black and white students at a graduation ceremony for
aesthetic reasons40 is regarded as illegitimate solely by virtue of the history of
race relations in the United States. A similar aesthetic choice, which segre-
gated blondes from brunettes, or those wearing white gowns from those wear-
ing black gowns, would not rest on an illegitimate purpose-assuming, of
course, no correlation with race.
The color-blind model's response to the aesthetic segregation hypothetical
must ultimately rest on an evaluation of historical circumstances, which the
model seeks to avoid. A directly historical response would be to condemn
aesthetic segregation as a potential reminder of the legacy of less benign segre-
gation based on prejudice, or as a harbinger of the return of that era. A differ-
ent response, which attempts to focus on the irrelevance of race, fails to explain
why aesthetic relevance is insufficient, that is, why a more compelling state
interest is necessary. Again, the explanation lies in circumstances outside the
purview of the color-blind model. In other words, the color-blind moders at-
tempt to focus solely on means cannot serve to constrain judicial discretion. A
determination of the legitimacy of the end ultimately necessitates resort to
sources beyond the fourteenth amendment and its history. The color-blind
35. Seegenerally R. BERGER, supra note 1; Berger, Mark Tushnet's Critique of Inerpretivism, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 532, 532 (1983) ("We are indeed better off being bound by the dead hand of the past
than being subjected to the whims of willful judges trying to make the Constitution live").
36. See Fiss, supra note I i, at 120 (characterizing means scrutiny approach as "mechanical jurispru-
dence"); Gunther, supra note 5, at 1 (proposing means scrutiny approach analogous to remand to legis-
lature for clarification of premises).
37. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through .4ntidiscrimination Law: .4 Critical Review
of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978).
38. Id at 1065 (emphasis in original).
39. Id at 1066. See also Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal
Protection, 58 TEx. L. REv. 1029, 1030 (1980) ("focus on means is always a subterfuge for evaluation of
ends"); cf. Fiss, supra note 11, at 165-66 (color-blind model is incomplete because it can provide no
standard for judging legitimate state goals).
40. See P. BREST, supra note 21, at 489 (positing the hypothetical in context of discussion of scope of
court's review).
1984]
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model lacks any principle that would both permit the unavoidable reference to
such sources and, at the same time, link the sources and their limits to some
constitutional principle. Thus, the color-blind approach to judicial restraint
fails on its own terms. It is no more successful at constraining judges than any
other model of heightened scrutiny. Its failure to recognize the necessity of
some extraconstitutional analysis in fact may reduce its ability to formulate
guidelines for restraint by preventing discussion of possible limits on such ex-
traconstitutional principles. 4'
The practical argument in favor of the color-blind model is derived from the
supposed impossibility of identifying which groups ought to receive the
Court's special protection. Justice Powell has argued that only the deliberate
use of race per se should trigger heightened scrutiny; otherwise the Court
would be mired in endless speculation as to the effect of an infinite number of
historical practices on the myriad ethnic groups in our society:
There is no principled basis for deciding which groups would merit
"heightened judicial solicitude" and which would not. Courts would
be asked to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and consequent harm
suffered by various minority groups. Those whose societal injury is
thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability then would be
entitled to preferential classifications at the expense of individuals be-
longing to other groups. Those classifications would be exempt from
exacting judicial scrutiny.42
There is in fact no inherent barrier to using this evaluative analysis to
demonstrate that particular groups are not deserving of the special protection
afforded by the application of heightened scrutiny: as Part III of this Article
will show, the Court engages in precisely that sort of analysis in areas other
than race and gender. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson43 is an illuminating example of this process. In order to justify apply-
ing heightened scrutiny to gender-based statutes, Justice Brennan canvassed
the history and continued existence of sex discrimination, the immutability
and accidental nature of gender, and the frequent irrelevance of gender to any
41. One response to this argument is, in essence, that there are certain governmental ends we all
know to be invalid, and racial segregation is one of them. If judges are limited to invalidating only
those ends condemned by public morality, the argument goes, that is all the constraint we need. See
Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982). The problem with any theory of con-
stitutional interpretation that proceeds from a notion of shared moral norms is that it operates only to
perpetuate the status quo and to serve the needs of the already rich and powerful. See Baker, supra
note 39, at 1055 ; Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN L. REv. 765 (1982); Tushnet, supra note 28,
at 785, 791-92. Since modern equal protection law is largely derived from the notion that it is the
Court's special function to protect the least politically powerful segments of society, see United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM.
L. REv. 1087 (1982), this approach is untenable.
42. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 296-97 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (footnote omitted); see also
id at 289-90 ("The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individ-
ual and something else when applied to a person of another color"); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312, 338, 340 (1978) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Note, Suspect Classiflcations: A Suspect Analysis, 87
DICK. L. REv. 407, 431 (1982) ("The equal protection doctrine was never meant to serve as a vehicle of
inequality by enabling courts to protect those possessing one aspect of an irrelevant trait while neglect-
ing those possessing other aspects").
43. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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legitimate government purpose.44 A similar analysis has led the Court to con-
clude that illegitimacy45 and alienage46 are suspect or quasi-suspect
classifications.
4. Precedents
The final criticism of the color-blind model is that it is inconsistent with
numerous decisions of the Court.47 First, it is difficult to reconcile the color-
blind model with the Court's extension of heightened scrutiny to nonracial
classifications, such as those based on gender or alienage. There is no doubt
that the post-Civil War framers focused solely on racial classifications; the
nineteenth amendment was not ratified until fifty years after the fifteenth. It is
thus difficult to justify expanding a color-blind theory into a gender-blind the-
ory if the basic interpretive principle is historical. Moreover, as noted earlier,
the very extension of the doctrine involves a type of analysis that the model is
designed to preclude: whatever analogy exists between race and gender, it can
only be determined by an examination of historical and social conditions.
Such an examination is a tacit recognition that heightened scrutiny must de-
pend on factors other than the language and history of the equal protection
clause.
Second, the color-blind model cannot be reconciled with cases validating
color-conscious legislation. The Court has declined to apply heightened scru-
tiny to explicitly color-conscious governmental action in a variety of circum-
stances. First, the judiciary itself has acted in a color-conscious manner in
ordering school busing as a remedy for segregated school systems. Where lo-
calities have previously segregated students by law, the Court has rejected the
color-blind assignment of pupils to neighborhood schools and instead insisted
on color-conscious methods of achieving racial balance.48 Second, in United
Jewish Organizations (UJO) v. Carey,49 the Court upheld a New York redis-
tricting plan concededly motivated solely by a color-conscious desire to in-
crease black voting power; the Court declined to apply heightened scrutiny.50
Finally, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,5I the Court upheld a ten percent minority set-
aside program without even a reference to heightened scrutiny. Chief Justice
Burger's plurality opinion explicitly rejected the color-blind model52 and ob-
served that although "a program that employs racial or ethnic criteria...
44. Id at 684-86 (plurality opinion).
45. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
46. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
47. This criticism is, of course, applicable only to the opinions of the Justices themselves, or to those
who claim that the color-blind model is descriptive of the Court's work. Those who argue for the color-
blind model as a prescriptive model are vulnerable to this criticism only insofar as they accept the
decisions in the inconsistent cases noted in the text.
48. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); see generally J. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME
COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION 1954-1978 (1979) (integration has clashed with competing ideals of
neighborhood schools and color-blind admissions).
49. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
50. Id at 161.
51. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
52. Id at 482. Justice Stewart, in dissent, explicitly supported the color-blind model. Id at 522-27
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
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calls for close examination," the Court is still "bound to approach [its] task
with appropriate deference to the Congress."53
These cases cannot be reconciled with the color-blind model. The Court's
posture in these cases is inevitably dependent on two assumptions that are in-
consistent with the color-blind model: first, that racial classifications do not
always trigger heightened scrutiny and its concomitant likelihood of invalida-
tion, and, second, that the determination of the appropriateness of race as a
selection criterion depends on an historical analysis of race relations in the
United States.54
B. THE SUBSTANCE MODEL
The substance model reflects an approach directly opposite to that of the
color-blind model. Adherents of this outcome-oriented model abandon all
structural or procedural restraints on judicial behavior and rely instead on ex-
tralegal, extraconstitutional principles to justify particular results. Such princi-
ples include equality of respect55 and equality of conditions.5 6 The search of
nonsubstance theorists for neutral constraints on the judiciary is dismissed as
impossible,57 with an almost tangible sense of utter frustration.5 8
The major flaw in the substance model is that it fails to explain when judi-
cial activism is appropriate and therefore is unable to posit any limits to such
activism. The failure to justify, on any constitutional basis, judicial interfer-
ence with legislative prerogatives has been consistently condemned by courts
and commentators since the demise of Lochner v. New York.59 The absence of
a generalized constitutional theory of judicial activism also traps the substance
model in a classic paradox: the substantive results applauded by the various
diverse adherents to the model are no more or less defensible, in constitutional
53. Id at 472 (emphasis added).
54. Freeman recognizes the basic contradiction between the color-blind model (encompassed in his
model of "perpetrator perspective") and the Court's action in the area of remedies and labels the period
of color-conscious remedies the era of contradiction. Freeman, supra note 37, at 1079.
55. See Baker, supra note 39, at 1030-31, 1058-59 (offering "the ethical principle that the government
must respect people's equality of worth"); Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Sub-
stantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1983) (arguing for equality of political
participation, equality of worth, and equality of resources and opportunities).
56. See Freeman, supra note 37, at 1052-53, 1070.
57. Most anti-process theorists argue that such restraints are a practical and theoretical impossibility.
See, e.g., Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 142 (1980); Shiffrin, supra note 34, at
1103, 1201; Tushnet, supra note 28, at 781. Others argue that such restraints are unnecessary. See
White, Review Essay: Judicial Activism and the Identity ofthe Legal Profession, 67 JUDICATURE 246
(1983) (arguing for greater confidence in legal training and use of established jurisprudential principles
to produce "true" and "right" decisions).
58. For an eloquent description of this frustration and its consequences, see Leff, Unspeakable Ethics,
UnnaturalLaw, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229; see also Shiffrin, supra note 34, at 1103, 1110 n.33 (radical recog-
nition of irreconcilable contradictions of liberalism promotes "alternating attitudes of cynicism and
despair").
59. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). John Ely has succinctly captured the argument against the Lochner ap-
proach: "A neutral principle may be a thing of beauty and a joy forever. But if it lacks connection with
any value the Constitution marks as special, it is not a Constitutional principle and the Court has no
business imposing it." Ely, The Wages ofCrying Wo/f A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
949 (1973); see also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 92-93 (1962) (arguing danger of judicial rule); Hand, Due Process ofLaw and the Eight
Hour Day, 21 HARV. L. REv. 495 (1908) (criticizing Lochner for straying beyond boundaries of four-
teenth amendment).
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or legal terms, than are any other results. The substance model, in its inherent
inability to describe constitutional limits on judicial policymaking, leaves us at
the mercy of judicial discretion. The posture of indifference to the Court's role
and processes, moreover, deprives the substance model of any intellectually
persuasive method of criticizing the Court's performance. To argue over the
correctness of results alone is to grant at least some legitimacy to any decision
of the Court. The substance model is counterproductive for legal advocacy
and legal scholarship insofar as it deprives critics of the Court of the tool of
rational argument. It is also internally inconsistent, because the background
and socioeconomic status of Justices suggest that they are a segment of society
most likely to perpetuate the very status quo deplored by most modem sub-
stance theorists. 60
A brief criticism of the most extreme version of the substance model, the
"deconstructionist ' 6 approach of some members of the critical legal studies
movement, illustrates the defects of the model. The legal deconstructionist de-
nies the objective validity of any interpretation of a text because interpreta-
tions, like theories, language, and even "facts," are merely manifestations of
subjective belief structures. 62 The act of interpretation is "not the art of con-
struing but the art of constructing. '63 Deconstruction is thus a matter of
"demystifying," of identifying and explaining the ideology or belief structures
underlying any particular interpretation. The ultimate extension of such a po-
sition is what Owen Fiss has aptly termed "nihilism": the argument that "for
any text . . . there are any number of possible meanings, that interpretation
consists of choosing one of those meanings, and that in this selection process
the judge will inevitably express his own values."'64 The basic premise of
deconstructionism, then, is that texts-including the Constitution-are inher-
ently indeterminate and that any interpretation is therefore as permissible as
any other. The deconstructionists thus criticize the courts solely on the basis of
outcome, reasoning that only substantive results count.
60. Justices have overwhelmingly been members of the privileged classes whose upbringing and edu-
cation cemented adherence to established norms. See Nowak, Professor Rodell, The Burger Court, and
Public Opinion, I CONST. COMMENTARY 107, 114-15 (1984); see also Developments: Representation of
Women and Minorities Among Top Graduates of Twenty Leading Law Schools, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 424
(1983) (indicating predominance of white males among top law school graduates). There are, of course,
exceptions: judges whose privileged background does not prevent them from being champions of the
powerless. See G.E. WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE (1982).
61. The term, and perhaps the legal movement, is rooted in literary theory: the deconstructionists
argue that no particular interpretation of a text is correct or incorrect. See Derrida, Signature Event
Context, GLYPH 1 172, 179 (1977) (interpreter must deconstruct metaphysics of presence in order to
leave the text bare); Miller, The Critic as Host, 3 CRITICAL INQUIRY 439 (1977) (describing deconstruc-
tion of poetry as a rhetorical discipline). The literary theory is explicitly applied to constitutional inter-
pretation by some substance theorists. See, eg., Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 373, 391
(1982) (footnote omitted) ("There are as many plausible readings of the United States Constitution as
there are versions of Hamlet, even though each interpreter, like each director, might genuinely believe
that he or she has stumbled onto the one best answer to the conundrums of the texts").
62. See generally Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PRO-
GRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281, 286-90 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
63. S. FISH, Is THERE A TExT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES
327 (1980).
64. Fiss, supra note 41, at 741; see also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 81-83 (1962)
(labeling legal realists as nihilists); White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60
TEX. L. REv. 415, 415 (1982) ("why are we reading ... these old opinions if they mean only whatever
we want them to mean?"); Miller, Tradition and Diflerence, 2 DIACRITICS 6, 12 (1972).
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In fact, the radical indeterminacy posited by legal deconstructionists is not
the only alternative to the focus on the framers' intent typified by the color-
blind model. In responding to the deconstructionist position I will argue first,
that something less than radical or absolute indeterminacy is a plausible alter-
native to intentionalism and -second, that a belief in the radical indeterminacy
of legal texts is inconsistent with the whole notion of a legal system.
The notion of radical indeterminacy is derived from a rejection of the idea
that words, sentences, or texts can have only one discoverable meaning. There
is thus a clear contrast between intentionalists or interpretivists, on the one
hand, who believe that the "meaning" of a text is what the author intended it
to mean, and deconstructionists, who contend that the "meaning" of a text is
what any reader interprets it to mean. In fact, neither approach is wholly
valid: the fact that some indeterminacy exists because words and texts are
unclear or ambiguous does not necessarily mean that the range of permissible
interpretations is unlimited. Language is inexact, and it is therefore impossible
for an author to say exactly what he means. 65 He can, however, give some
indication of what he means and, more important, can make clear a number of
things he does not mean. The process of interpretation therefore is one of
choosing among a limited number of plausible meanings. The text itself indi-
cates the range of permissible meanings. 66
If we accept the existence of but a limited number of plausible meanings, the
remaining question is whether the deconstructionist approach can be applied
to the choice among these alternative interpretations. In other words, are all
plausible alternatives equally acceptable? The deconstructionist would claim
that they are, and the critical legal scholar would maintain that the choice is
made solely on the basis of the judge's own values and preferences.
James Gordley has recently refuted this contention by describing the middle
ground between the mechanical application of rules of decision and the unfet-
tered exercise of judicial discretion.67 What judges do, Gordley argues, is to
begin with authoritative rules of decision (for example, with the Constitution)
and to derive from these rules their underlying "criteria"-that is, the standard
of "justice or rightness or usefulness"68 on which the rules are based. These
65. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 414 (1819) ("such is the character of human
language, that no word conveys to the mind, in all situations, one single definite idea. . . ."); see also
W. ALSTON, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 44 (1964) (virtually all words have more than one meaning);
Gordley, Legal.Reasoning An Introduction, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 138, 141 (1984) ("language ... does not
come stacked with expressions that mean exactly what one wishes to say").
66. See Abrams, The Deconstructive Angel, 3 CRITICAL INQUIRY 425, 427-28 (1977) (while no one
interpretation of passage exhausts everything it means, there are correct and incorrect interpretations);
White, supra note 64, at 428-29 (there are interpretations that "cannot be right"); Wright, Professor
Bickel The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 785 (1971) (even vague
constitutional provisions "rule out many alternative directions, goals, and ideals"). As Quine realized,
the process of interpretation is neither the discovery of hidden meanings nor the creation of new ones,
but rather the resolution of ambiguities and the filling in of the necessarily interstitial meaning of the
author. W.V.O. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 258-59 (1960). Fish argues that it is not the text itself, but
the context of the "interpretive community" that limits the range of meanings available; nevertheless,
he does concede that such limits exist. S. FISH, supra note 63, at 293-99. For a critique of the notion of
"interpretive communities," see Brest, supra note 41, at 765.
67. Gordley, supra note 65, at 138; see also S. FISH, supra note 63, at 335; Schauer, An Essay on
Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797, 806-07 (1982).
68. Gordley, supra note 65, at 142.
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criteria provide the starting point for the attempt to discover the "determina-
tive circumstances" 69 in each case. These circumstances are those facts that
"call for a particular result according to the authority's criteria. '70 While a
judge may rarely, if ever, discern the full range of such circumstances, he can
formulate rules that reflect some of them. Each case provides the opportunity
for refinement of these "partial rules" 71 through the use of various analytical
techniques. Gordley's point is that these refinements need not reflect mere sub-
jective preferences. Instead, they may be based upon reasoning guided by ap-
preciation of the criteria underlying the authoritative rule in question. While
there is some judicial discretion in this process, that discretion is not uncon-
strained; rather, it is limited by the requirements that the judge explain his
reasoning and justify his choice by recourse to institutional values.
The question then becomes why we should prefer a theory that limits judges
to the institutional, result-independent choices that the Gordley position sug-
gests. What is wrong with describing what judges do as the deconstructionists
describe it, instead of as Gordley does? I see two serious problems with the
deconstructionist approach. First, if judicial decisionmaking is essentially in-
determinate, there can exist no criteria for evaluating the correctness of judi-
cial interpretations or even of outcomes. Given this state of affairs, why
should any interpretation, or any theory of interpretation, be preferred over
any other? The deconstructionist's denial of the intrinsic correctness of any
interpretation or interpretive theory must necessarily encompass his or her
own interpretation as well. Deconstructionism thus not only denies the value
of its own propositions, it makes criticism of them unproductive. As one critic
of literary deconstruction has suggested, "[s]cholars are right to feel indignant
toward those . . . writers who deliberately exploit the institutions of scholar-
ship--even down to its punctilious conventions like footnotes and quota-
tions-to deny the whole point of the institutions of scholarship, to deny, that
is, the possibility of knowledge." 72
Second, the denial of the possibility of knowledge, and specifically of correct
legal or constitutional reasoning, may be provocative as an academic exercise,
but it undermines the necessary presence in American society of dispute-
resolving mechanisms. If one claims that there is no determinate basis for in-
terpreting texts or resolving ambiguities, that claim radically alters the defini-
tion of judging. The deconstructionist position (and the substance theory in
general) transforms the notion of "judging" from that of performing a particu-
lar action or process to that of achieving a particular result. Judging is an act
or process only if it is envisioned as an independent or "adequately neutral ' 73
method of reaching results in ambiguous situations. As soon as the judge's
own values are deemed to be the basis for the decision, the process or act of
69. Id at 163.
70. Id
71. Id at 162. See also Tushnet, supra note 28, at 818-19 (judging as a "craft").
72. E.D. HIRSCH, JR., THE AIMS OF INTERPRETATION 13 (1976); see also Rehnquist, Act Well Your
Part: Therein.4l Honor Lies, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 227, 231-33, 238-39 (1980) (criticism of Court must
be based on principles, not results).
73. See Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional Val-
ues, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 200, 215 (1984) (noting that while perfect neutrality is impossible, adequate
neutrality is sufficient).
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deciding has instead become the achievement or implementation of a particu-
lar decision.
The inevitable consequence of this transformation is to alter the range of
criticisms to which judges may be expected to be responsive or accountable.
Actors, including judges, can. only be held accountable for breaking the "rules"
that apply to the action they are performing. A change in the action being
performed results in a corresponding change in the rules applied to its per-
formance. Under the Gordley theory, an act of "judging" may validly be criti-
cized for violating the "rule" of adequately distinguishing contrary precedent
or the "rule" of serving such institutional values as simplicity or predictability.
Under the substance theory, on the other hand, valid criticism of an act of
"judging" takes a wholly different form. For a critical legal scholar such as
Baker, an act of judging might be criticized for not following the "rule" of
according all persons equal respect.74 For a conservative such as Justice Rehn-
quist, on the other hand, an act of judging might be criticized for not following
the "rule" that where there is a conflict between the government and an indi-
vidual, the government ought to prevail.75 Such criticisms are based on prem-
ises entirely independent of the function of the judiciary or the legal system
and instead must import moral or political philosophy. The act of judging
thus is essentially indistinguishable from any act by any citizen of the polity.
Judges no longer are primarily responsible for providing answers to the legal
disputes society needs to resolve.76
The theoretical basis for the substance model thus casts us adrift from the
Constitution as a governing document, insofar as it leaves us neither with an-
swers nor with any justifiable way of approaching the questions. While this
approach may, perhaps, be defensible as a tool of literary interpretation, it is
fundamentally incompatible with the role of legal interpretation. "Interpreta-
tion in the humanities," Paul Brest has pointed out, "is essentially concerned
with exposing and illuminating ambiguity; it exalts indeterminacy. Legal in-
terpretation seeks to resolve ambiguity. 77
One appeal of the substance model has been its ability to achieve what seem
to be just results unattainable under any other theory.78 The color-blind theo-
rist rejects affirmative action programs; 79 the process theorist rejects-or can-
not satisfactorily justify-a presumption of invalidity of neutral statutes with a
74. See Baker, supra note 55, at 933; Baker, supra note 39, at 1029.
75. See Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: .4 Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 294 (1976) (sug-
gesting this as Justice Rehnquist's "rule" after 4 1/2 years on the Court).
76. See generally M.J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN IN-
QUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (1982); see also
D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 31 (1977) ("Judges do not have the abstract legal right
to enforce whatever they believe to be morally right, or to declare illegal whatever is immoral").
77. Brest, supra note 41, at 765, 770; see also Schauer, Does Doctrine Aatter?, 82 MICH. L. REv. 655
(1984) (suggesting that Justices are constrained by neutral principles).
78. This is not to suggest that either the substance theorist or the antisubstance theorist is essentially
result-oriented. It is merely to observe that legal scholars, like all other human beings, cannot ignore
what they perceive to be manifest social injustice and that the perception of injustice inevitably shapes
their scholarship. See G.E. WHITE, PATrERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 136 (1978) ("the moral
sensibility of scholars is necessarily molded by their social experience, and critical intelligence is in the
end an arm of moral sensibility").
79. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)
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disproportionate impact.80 At least one process theorist does attempt to argue
in favor of this latter result.8 ' Owen Fiss contends that the Supreme Court
ought to adopt what he calls the "group-disadvantaging principle" instead of
the "anti-discrimination principle."82 Adoption of the former principle would,
he reasons, achieve the two "just" results described above. Fiss ultimately fails
to persuade, however, because he offers little justification for his "group-dis-
advantaging principle" beyond its inherent rightness and the fact that it leads
to just results.8 3 His analysis is, in the end, subject to the same criticisms as is
the basic substance theory: in his eagerness to reach the results advocated by
many substance theorists, he leaves us without sufficient nexus to the Constitu-
tion and devoid of restraints on the judiciary.
The rest of this article will be devoted to making the logical connection that
seems to be missing from Fiss' otherwise insightful analysis: what constitu-
tional principles justify heightened judicial review, and what limits do those
principles impose? Part II summarizes one effort to develop such principles,
the "process" theory suggested by Carolene Products8 4 and elaborated by John
Hart Ely.85 Part III then demonstrates that the implications of this model lead
to a focus on whether legislation operates to the detriment of a disfavored
class, a focus that goes beyond Ely's concern with legislative motive and that in
fact reflects the concern underlying the Court's best-reasoned equal protection
decisions. Part IV represents a practical application of this "disfavored class"
theory. The remainder of this Article thus should indicate how the model sug-
gested here leads to the very results advocated by both Fiss and the substance
theorists, while at the same time maintaining a constitutional basis through its
emphasis on the nature of the legislative process.
II. STRICT SCRUTINY AND LEGISLATIVE MOTIVE: THE PROCESS MODEL
Those who seek to avoid the defects of the two extreme models just dis-
cussed must construct a theory that places some workable constraints on judi-
cial action and that is consistent with both history and precedent. The Court
has in fact adopted just such a middle course-a "process" model-but has
failed to articulate in its opinions an adequate explanation for it; the most
extensive justification for such an approach has come from John Hart Ely.86
In explaining its heightened scrutiny approach, the Court generally relies on a
cursory reference to the famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene
Productss7 and simply states that heightened scrutiny is appropriate when, be-
cause the minority group affected by the statute is small, isolated, and power-
less, the normal Madisonian principle that diversity defeats tyranny 8 fails to
operate: the democratic political process is unable to rectify harms done to
80. Ely, supra note 30, at 1254-60.
81. Fiss, supra note 11, at 167.
82. See generally id
83. Id at 170-72, 174.
84. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
85. J. ELY, supra note 10.
86. Id
87. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
88. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
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groups that do not fully participate in that process.89 The notion of insularity is
crucial to the process model; the mere existence of underrepresentation or rela-
tive lack of political power cannot justify heightened scrutiny. The process
model does not contemplate the Court as a superlegislature, operating to hold
unconstitutional all legislation that ignores minority preferences. Instead, the
process model confronts the unique role that irrational prejudice and hostility
play in an individual's decisionmaking process. It is the barrier that irrational
prejudices create for even well-represented minorities attempting to work
within the legislative process, and not the mere fact of underrepresentation,
that constitutes the process defect that justifies judicial activism under the pro-
cess model.90
As one commentator has observed, the consequence of prejudice is a failure
by the prejudiced majority to recognize the advantages of exploring and fur-
thering interests held in common with the despised minority: "The black mi-
nority's claim to judicial solicitude is not that it is voiceless but friendless, not
politically invisible but politically unmarriageable." 91 The underlying premise
of this aspect of the process model is that truly rational decisionmaking cannot
reflect irrational biases92 and thus that judicial interference is warranted be-
cause the legislative process is irremediably flawed in the context of legislation
affecting minorities.
The Court has recognized that even the explicit use of racial classifications
may be exempt from heightened scrutiny if it is obviously not motivated by
hostility or prejudice. In upholding a New York redistricting plan concededly
designed solely to increase the voting power of New York City's black resi-
dents, the Court declined to apply heightened scrutiny because the redistricting
plan "represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other
race . . . 93
As many commentators have noted, the requirement of a more important
governmental purpose and a tighter fit between the means and the end is sine-
89. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 23 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); O'Bannon v. Town
Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 800-01 & n.8 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also United
States v. McDonald, 481 F.2d 513, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (opinion of Bazelon, J.) (' where electoral
accountability is absent, normal presumptions of legislative regularity have a weaker claim").
90. See J. ELY, supra note 10, at 153 (racial prejudice provides majority with common motive to
disadvantage racial minorities); Baker, supra note 39, at 1044 (unfettered political process incorporates
preferences to restrict or exploit minorities).
91. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analsis, 60 CALIF. L.
REv. 275, 315 (1972). See also Cover, The Origis of JudicialActipism in the Protection of Minorilies, 91
YALE L.J. 1287, 1296 (1982). The failure of the white majority to recognize blacks as members of a
common community, and the resulting denigration of the interests of both groups, is illustrated by the
facts of such cases as Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), and Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966). See Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 457-58 (1984),
92. SeeJ. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 251-53 (1971) (truly rational thought necessarily moral); cf.
I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 122 (Beck trans. 1956) (only rational principles are moral).
This premise also suggests one reason for the process model's rejection of at least the extreme versions
of the substance model. The deconstructionist position denies that there is any epistemological com-
mon ground among human beings; as Richard Rorty has noted, "[t]o suggest that there is no such
common ground seems to endanger rationality." R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NA-
TURE 317 (1979).
93. UJO v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977). The Court has elsewhere stressed that it will not inter-
fere with ordinary legislative choices "absent some reason to infer antipathy" toward the group disad-
vantaged by the choice. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1973).
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ply a method of avoiding any direct examination of legislative motivation
while still identifying and invalidating those statutes likely to be based on ra-
cial hostility or other illicit motives. 94 For the process theorist, any satisfactory
explanation of the doctrine of suspect classifications must recognize that what
is "suspect" about those statutes subjected to heightened scrutiny is the moti-
vation of the legislature. Any rationale used to justify application of height-
ened scrutiny therefore must center on the likelihood of illicit motives, ranging
from hostility to prejudice-based indifference.95 The next section of this Arti-
cle will attempt to show that the Court has lost sight of this central feature of
heightened scrutiny as a result of logical and linguistic confusion generated by
the Court's interchangeable use of the concepts of "class" and "classification."
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROCESS MODEL
A. DEFINING CONSTITUTIONAL TERMS: CLASS OR CLASSIFICATION?
In determining whether to apply heightened scrutiny to a particular statute,
the Court often evidences some confusion as to what it is about a statute that
triggers heightened scrutiny. In some cases, the Court appears to reject the
classjfcation itself-the general characteristic by which the statutory line is
drawn. At other times, the Court focuses instead on a disfavored class: those
persons who, because they possess one particular aspect of the identifying
characteristic, are disadvantaged by the statute.96 All classifications (such as
94. Michael Perry, for example, has suggested that any statute likely to be "predicated on the view
that one... group is by virtue of race morally inferior," Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptu-
alization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1046 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Modern Equal Pro-
tection], should be deemed suspect in order to "obviate ... the need for either party to introduce
evidence probative of actual state of mind." Id at 1034 (footnote omitted). See also J. ELY, supra note
10, at 145 (suspect classification functions as "handmaiden of motivation analysis"); L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUtiONAL LAW 1932 (1978) (strict scrutiny used for government acts that, in historical
context, are most likely to reflect racial prejudice); Brest, Foreword- In Defense of the Anti-Discrimina-
tion Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 15, (1977) (strict scrutiny proxy for direct inquiry into integrity of
decision making process); Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L.
REV. 723, 731 (1974) (historical fact of indefensible disadvantage makes suspect legislation singling out
group for disadvantage); Goodman, supra note 91, at 275, 319 (racial classifications most often the
product of racial animus); Perry, The Principle ofEqualProtectio, 32 HASTINoS L.J. 1133, 1151 (1981)
(function of strict scrutiny to reveal illicit legislative considerations) [hereinafter cited as Principle of
Equal Protection]; Simon, Racial, Prejudiced GovernmentalActions: A Motivation Theory of the Consti-
tutionalBanAgainst Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1069 (1978) (suspect classifica-
tion doctrine addresses laws likely premised on prejudicial attitudes); Note, A Madisonian Interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause, 91 YALE LJ. 1403, 1415 n.41 (1982) (use of suspect classification in
statute suggests prejudice); cf. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 189, 230-31 (1983) (same argument in context of content-based restrictions on expression). Illicit
racial motives also can include racially based indifference. See Brest, supra, at 7-8, 14.
95. It also might be argued that heightened scrutiny is justified on the basis of a judgment of inap-
propriateness. Use of certain classifications might either be unfair or likely to lead to undesirable con-
sequences and therefore is disfavored. The problem with this argument is that it does not explain why
the judiciary, rather than the legislature, ought to make the determination of unfairness or undesirabil-
ity. If the legislature determines that it is neither unfair nor potentially divisive to tax the wealthy at
higher rates, the Court accepts that judgment unless it is patently irrational. The "inappropriateness"
thesis fails to distinguish between the tax statute and a racially discriminatory statute on the basis of
any principle that could serve to limit judicial discretion to second-guess the legislature.
96. Compare Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) ("ft]he guarantee
of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when
applied to a person of another color") with Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
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race or gender) yield two or more classes (such as black/white or male/female)
possessing distinguishable aspects of the identifying characteristic. Whether
the Court justifies application of heightened scrutiny on the basis of the distin-
guishing classification or the disadvantaged class has profound consequences
for the cohesiveness and intellectual persuasiveness of the doctrine of height-
ened scrutiny.97 The distinction between class and classification also clarifies
the use of heightened scrutiny in two particularly difficult contexts: reverse or
benign discrimination and neutral statutes with a disproportionate impact on a
particular class.
Two examples should illustrate how the distinction between class and classi-
fication has confounded the Court. In Craig v. Boren,98 the Court invalidated
an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under 21 or
to females under 18. In a few brief paragraphs, Justice Brennan's majority
opinion concluded that all "statutory classifications that distinguish between
males and females" are subject to heightened scrutiny and must therefore
"serve important governmental objectives and. . . be substantially related to
achievement of their objectives." 99 The majority thus engaged exclusively in
classification-based analysis, applying heightened scrutiny to all classifications
using the disfavored characteristic of gender, without inquiring whether the
class disadvantaged by Oklahoma's statute was a disfavored class. 00 Justice
Rehnquist used a class-based approach in his dissent, arguing vigorously that
the Court's opinion was inadequate to justify heightened scrutiny, since it did
not suggest "that males in this age group are in any way peculiarly disadvan-
312 (1976) ("equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when
the classification . . . operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class").
97. The Court's use of class-based and classification-based analysis interchangeably is analogous to
what Gilbert Ryle termed a category-mistake: it asks the same questions about classes and classifica-
tions, thus treating classifications "as if they belonged to one logical type or category. . . when they
actually belong to another." G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 16 (1949). Ryle's example of a category-
mistake is useful in this context:
A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of colleges,
libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments and administrative offices. He then
asks 'But where is the University?. I have seen where the members of the Colleges live, where
the Registrar works, where the scientists experiment and the rest. But I have not yet seen the
University in which reside and work the members of your University.'
Id
Just as "the University" is the composite of all the other entities listed, and not a coordinate entity,
the relationship between a class and classification is that between categories, not within a category. A
visitor to New York, being told that there is a "race problem" in the United States, and shown the
neighborhoods of Queens, Harlem, and Chinatown, would make a category-mistake if he asked: "I
have seen white people, black people and Asian people, but where are the race of people you say you
have such a problem with?" Whites, blacks, and Asians are members of various classes falling under
the classifcation "race," and it is logically absurd to equate the class with the classification. It is my
contention that the Court is wielding the concepts of class and classification incorrectly when it applies
the same scrutiny to a statute involving a disfavored classification and to a statute disadvantaging a
disfavored class.
98. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
99. Id at 197. The Craig test is still the standard by which most gender-based classifications are
judged. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 724 (1982) (invalidating nursing school's
policy of admitting only women).
100. Justice Rehnquist recognized this problem, noting that the majority opinion "treats gender clas.
sification as a talisman which-without regard to the rights involved or the persons affected-calls into
effect a heavier burden of judicial review." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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taged, subject to systematic discriminatory treatment, or otherwise in need of
special solicitude from the courts."10'
While in Craig Justice Brennan engaged in unexamined classification-based
analysis, in Regents v. Bakke'02 it is Justice Powell's opinion that most closely
tracks classification-based analysis; the Brennan 0 3 opinion strongly suggests a
class-based analysis. Powell condemned the affirmative action program at is-
sue as "a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status."' 104 He firmly re-
jected as impractical and unprincipled the idea of bestowing special status-
and thus the advantage of heightened scrutiny-on only some classes possess-
ing some aspects of racial or ethnic identifying characteristics. Justice Brennan
rejected this rigid view of the uses of heightened scrutiny' 0 5 and instead fo-
cused on the social status of the disadvantaged group, concluding that "whites
as a class [do not] have any of the 'traditional indicia of suspectness' .... ," 06
This class-based analysis echoes Rehnquist's criticism of Brennan's majority
approach in Craig.07
Craig and Bakke are not random examples of the Court's confusion. In fact,
race and gender are the only areas in which any members of the Court have
seriously engaged in classification-based analysis,108 and even then the Justices
have done so only when the statutory scheme is perceived as reverse or benign
discrimination. In reviewing statutes disadvantaging illegitimates, aliens, the
elderly, and the poor, the Court has been much more likely to use a class-
based analysis than a classification-based analysis. 10 9 Moreover, whenever the
Court engages in sustained coherent analysis of the issues, it seems to favor a
101. Id at 219.
102. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
103. The opinion was jointly authored by Justices Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun, and is
referred to as Justice Brennan's for convenience.
104. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (footnote omitted).
105. Id at 355 (opinion of Brennan, J.) ("[Tihe position that [racial or ethnic] factors must be 'consti-
tutionally an irrelevancy,' summed up by the shorthand phrase 'our Constitution is color-blind,' has
never been adopted by this Court") (citations omitted).
106. Id at 357; see also id at 387-96 (opinion of Marshall, J.).
107. Justice Brennan's seemingly inconsistent positions in Craig and Bakke might be reconciled if
the determination of which class is disadvantaged by a challenged statute includes consideration of the
possible perpetuation of stereotypes. See infra notes 117 to 125 and accompanying text (discussing
concepts of stereotype and stigma).
108. The Court uses classification-based analysis when scrutinizing schemes based on national ori-
gin, but the Court's discussion of national origin strongly suggests that it considers national origin the
equivalent of race. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478,479 (1954); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944). See also L. TRIE, supra note 94, at 1052 n.3 ("The Supreme Court has
assimilated discrimination based on specific national origin to racial or ancestral discrimination"). This
confusion is understandable since most examples of discrimination on the basis of national origin are
directed against either Asians or Hispanics; the former is a racial group and the latter is popularly
perceived as one. Cf. Lusky, Footnote Redux .4 Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REv.
1093, 1105 n.72 (1982) (describing Hispanics and Asians as "ethnic groups. . . who are held at arm's
length" from the community). For an elaboration of how national origin fits into class-based analysis,
see infra notes 166 to 186 and accompanying text.
109. In fact, outside the areas of race and gender, the Court frequently frames the issue as whether
the challenged statute "operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
216 (1982) (alienage); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (age); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (wealth); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68, 71 (1968) (illegitimacy); see also Principle of Equal Protection, supra note 94, at 1133, 1149 (age).
One commentator has charged that even when the Court seems to be focusing on the distinguishing
characteristic this merely masks a deeper focus on the class: "The Court applies equal protection by
determining a group that should receive judicial solicitude and then discovering which trait forms the
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class-based analysis; classification-based analysis is usually the result of poor
or insufficient reasoning. This is because a thorough consideration of the ra-
tionales behind the doctrine of heightened scrutiny entails adoption of class-
based analysis.
An examination of the factors thought to justify heightened scrutiny bears
out this point. In its consideration of what level of scrutiny to apply, the Court
has frequently discussed four factors: (1) the existence of past and present dis-
crimination against the affected class, especially where such discrimination has
led to a condition of perpetual powerlessness; (2) the stereotypes reflected in
the classification scheme; (3) the societal relevance of the distinguishing char-
acteristic; and (4) the degree to which an individual can control or change the
characteristic.'1 0 A close examination of all four factors yields the conclusion
that the justifications for applying heightened scrutiny are persuasive only in
the context of a class-based analysis. Such an analysis suggests that process
theory necessarily must move beyond a concern with the facial neutrality of
legislative enactments.
B. IN SUPPORT OF CLASSIFICATION: EXAMINING THE REASONS FOR STRICT
SCRUTINY
1. Political Powerlessness and Discrimination
The Court frequently justifies heightened scrutiny by reference to Justice
Stone's Carolene Products footnote. I In particular, the Court asks whether
the group affected by the statute is a "discrete and insular minority." 1 2 This
language has come to be a shorthand phrase for the combination of historical
discrimination and political powerlessness thought to justify special judicial
basis for distinguishing that group from the rest of the population. The trait, once determined, becomes
disfavored and, hence, a basis for suspect classification." Note, supra note 42, at 407, 430 n. 193.
Earlier courts and Justices, before the development of the suspect classifications doctrine, apparently
viewed the equal protection clause as affording primarily class-based protection. See The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883) (fourteenth amendment prohibits legislation that denies rights to "any race
or class"); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873) (fourteenth amendment limited to
"negroes as a class"); G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLuTIoN 315 (1977) (fourteenth
amendment viewed at time of Reconstruction as directed at protection of former slaves). Moreover, an
emphasis on the stigmatizing effect of discriminatory legislation-which suggests a class-based focus-
is found in the thought of one of the most prominent framers of the fourteenth amendment, Charles
Sumner. Sumner contended that segregated schools violated "that fundamental right of all citizens,
equality before the Law," because they branded "a whole race with the stigma of inferiority." W. PEASE
& J. PEASE, THE ANTISLAVERY ARGUMENT 288 (1965); see generally Farber & Muench, supra note 1.
The Court's inconsistency in this area is an apt illustration of the maxim that hard cases make bad
law. In the absence of political pressure or conflicting values, the Court uses the more coherent class-
based analysis. It is only when class-based analysis yields results the Justices prefer not to reach-i.e.,
in reverse discrimination cases-that the Court resorts to classification-based analysis.
110. See L. TRIBE, supra note 94, at 1053 (describing factors considered by Court in invoking strict
scrutiny).
111. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
112. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 23 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 113-14 n. 1 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). Justice Rehnquist has
charged that a judicial finding of discreteness and insularity automatically invalidates any legislation
disadvantaging the disfavored class: "The approach taken in Graham and these cases appears to be
that whenever the Court feels that a societal group is 'discrete and insular,' it has the constitutional
mandate to prohibit legislation that somehow treats the group differently from some other group."
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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solicitude for the disfavored class. The focus is on whether the class possesses
"the traditional indicia of suspectness": Is the class "saddled with such disabil-
ities, or subject to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary pro-
tection from the majoritaritan political process?"' 1 3 In emphasizing the polit-
ical powerlessness or isolation of a class, or the history of discrimination
against the class, the Court is focusing on the social status of a class rather than
on the classification or identifying characteristic itself.
It is clear, for example, that in the following passage from his opinion in
Bakke Justice Brennan is expressing his belief that the evil of race discrimina-
tion is not inherent in the mere classification along racial lines but rather in the
disadvantaging of racial minorities:
Unlike discrimination against racial minorities, the use of racial pref-
erences for remedial purposes does not inflict a pervasive injury upon
individual whites in the sense that wherever they go or whatever they
do there is a significant likelihood that they will be treated as second-
class citizens because of their color. This distinction does not mean
that the exclusion of a white resulting from the preferential use of
race is not sufficiently serious to require justification; it does mean
that the injury inflicted by such a policy is not distinguishable from
disadvantages caused by a wide range of government actions, none of
which has ever been thought impermissible for that reason alone. 114
Brennan's focus on the difference between the consequences of state action
disadvantaging blacks and the consequences of state action disadvantaging
whites implies that it is not the distinguishing characteristic (race) that triggers
heightened scrutiny, but rather the social and political disadvantages that
members of a class possessing that characteristic have historically suffered.
Justice Rehnquist recently recognized a similar limitation on strict scrutiny,
suggesting in Michael M v. Superior Court' 15 that a gender-specific statutory
rape law can withstand judicial scrutiny in part because there is "nothing to
suggest that men, because of past discrimination or peculiar disadvantages, are
in need of the special solicitude of the courts." 16
2. Stereotypes
A second factor frequently cited in discussions of statutes thought to violate
113. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); accordRegents v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 313 (1976).
114. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 375 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
115. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
116. Id at 476 (plurality opinion); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218-19 (1976) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (nothing suggests males aged 19 to 20 peculiarly disadvantaged). An analogous idea is
the notion, expressed in several recent gender discrimination cases, that gender discrimination is consti-
tutional when men and women are "not similarly situated." See Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985,
2996 (1983) (men and women differently situated for purposes of parental custody); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78 (1981) (men and women not similarly situated for purposes of draft registra-
tion because of combat requirements of military); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469
(1981) (possibility of pregnancy of women makes men and women differently situated for purposes of
statutory rape law).
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the equal protection clause is the statutes' reliance on or perpetuation of nega-
tive stereotypes about class members. 1 7 The existence of stereotypes, however,
cannot by itself suggest that a class is disfavored. First, as Ely has suggested,
the constitutional infirmity of stereotyping lies in the unwitting legislative
overvaluation of generalizations, not in the mere fact that the generalizations
do not always hold true. All statutes generalize; the focus must be on the
causes of such overgeneralizations. Only overgeneralizations based on igno-
rance or undervaluation of the interests of otherwise disfavored groups are
suspect.""
Second, a stereotype about one class is almost always a generalization about
that class' relative abilities or characteristics and thus implies a converse stereo-
type about another class. For example, the statute at issue in Craig v. Boren' 19
might be based on questionable stereotypes of females as reaching legal matur-
ity at an earlier date because their inferior role in society demands less time in
the protective cradle of legal minority 120 or as merely passively following the
irresponsible lead of older male companions. 12 On the other hand, these ste-
reotypes inevitably suggest that young males are correspondingly less mature
and more actively irresponsible than young females.' 22 But since all statutes
rely on some type of overgeneralization or stereotype, there is nothing to ex-
plain why gender stereotypes are any worse than other kinds of stereotypes. 123
The Court's use of the existence of stereotypes to invalidate statutes is there-
fore puzzling unless we move from the stereotypes exhibited by any particular
statute to the prevalence of certain stereotypes in society in general. In other
words, while a statute's stereotyping of women may be relevant to the question
whether that statute in fact advantages or disadvantages women, 124 it cannot
117. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (gender-based
statutes deserve heightened scrutiny because they may reflect or perpetuate stereotypes about roles and
capabilities of men and women); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 114 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(statute deficient because it negatively stereotypes aged); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976)
(negative stereotype of young males inappropriate legislative premise); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
523 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (illegitimacy classification embodies inappropriate negative stereo-
type); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discrimination in favor of
widows and against widowers reflects stereotype of women).
118. J. ELY, supra note 10, at 155-60.
119. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
120. Brief for Appellant at 5-6, 46 n.14, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
121. See Baker, supra note 39, at 1092 n.180 (noting social practice of women's involvement with
older men); Ginsburg, Sex, Equality and the Constitution, 4 WOMEN'S RIGTS L. REP. 143, 145 (1978)
(discussing social stereotype of women as docile and submissive).
122. Baker, supra note 39, at 1092. The potential for the Craig statute to be interpreted this way also
suggests the difficulty in distinguishing negative from positive stereotypes.
123. See J. ELY, supra note 10, at 159-60 (suggesting ease of acceptance of most generalizations),
124. See UJO v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173-74 & n.3 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring):
[E]ven preferential treatment may act to stigmatize its recipient groups, for although in-
tended to correct systemic or institutional inequities, such a policy may imply to some the
recipients' inferiority and especial need for protection. . . . This phenomenon seems to have
arisen with respect to policies affording preferential treatment to women: thus groups dedi-
cated to advancing the legal position of women have appeared before this Court to challenge
statutes that facially offer advantages to women and not men. This strategy, one surmises, can
be explained on the basis that even good faith policies favoring women may serve to highlight
stereotypes concerning their supposed dependency and helplessness.
See also Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tell us whether disadvantaging someone on the basis of gender is a suspicious
legislative exercise. A particular statute's stereotyped view is relevant to that
latter question only insofar as it is evidence of the widespread acceptance of
similar stereotypes.
The question then becomes why the prevalence of certain gender-based ste-
reotypes leads us to question the legislature's impartiality more than we would
in the absence of such widely accepted generalizations. That is, how does the
popular acceptance of stereotypes corrupt the legislative process and justify
judicial intervention? If there is any distinction between a statute based on
inaccurate generalizations about the differences between opticians and optom-
etrists or between truck companies and railroads and a statute based on inac-
curate generalizations about the differences between men and women, it must
be that only in the latter case is one class consistently denigrated in popularly
accepted stereotypes. Negative stereotyping is a method of stigmatizing, of
distancing oneself from an inferior "other."' 25 If a group is consistently nega-
tively stereotyped, that fact is evidence of its insularity and its inability to com-
bat overt or covert prejudice against group members. But it is the evidence of
prejudice against one class, and not the fact that the classification may be based
on inaccurate stereotypes of both classes, that suggests the use of heightened
scrutiny.
3. Irrelevance
A third factor frequently relied on by the Court is the societal irrelevance of
the distinguishing characteristic.126 In Toll v. Moreno, 27 for example, the dis-
pute between Justice Rebnquist's dissent and Justice Blackmun's concurrence
turned on whether the characteristic of alienage was relevant to the statutory
purpose of providing educational benefits to residents. 28 A discussion that fo-
cuses on the relevance of the characteristic itself would appear to suggest the
epitome of classification-based analysis: the question of relevance is a ques-
tion of the legitimacy of using a particular characteristic to draw lines. Justice
Rehnquist's analysis illuminates how consideration of the relevance of an
identifying characteristic can be linked to classification-based analysis. He
reasoned that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause . . . reflects the judgment of its
Framers that some distinguishing characteristics may seldom, if ever, be the basis
125. See generallyG. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 3-15, 48-65, 189-204 (1954); F.J. DAVIS,
MINORITY-DOMINANT RELATIONS 47-51 (1978); H. EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE
20-60 (1973); E. GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 109 (1963);
R. MORGAN, THE ANATOMY OF FREEDOM 283 (1982); W. RYAN, EQUALITY (1981); W. RYAN, BLAM-
ING THE VICTIM (1971); A. SCHAEF, WOMEN'S REALITY 69-70 (1981); Karst, W4hy Equality Matters, 17
GA. L. REV. 245, 248-49 (1983); Wirth, The Problem of Minority Groups, in THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN
THE WORLD CRISIS 347, 347-72 (R. Linton ed. 1945).
126. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 22 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Ely, supra note 94, at 730-31
(irrelevance to any legitimate public purpose is major factor justifying special scrutiny of racial
classifications).
127. 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
128. Compare id at 22 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (alienage may be constitutionally relevant to polit-
ical activity, but not to private activity such as education) with id at 41-42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(cases involving exclusion from office recognize alienage may be constitutionally permissible
classification).
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for dference in treatment by the legislature."' 129 His conclusion that citizenship
status was not such an automatically forbidden classification led him to con-
sider whether it was a relevant characteristic in that case, and his treatment of
that issue further illustrated how a classification-based analysis focuses on the
characteristic rather than on those who possess one or more aspects of it. He
described earlier cases as accepting the constitutional relevance of "alienage,
or the other side of the coin, citizenship .... -130
A simple classification-based treatment of irrelevance, however, merely begs
the question of why certain characteristics should not be considered legitimate.
More important, it raises the question of which branch of government should
make the factual and ethical decisions regarding relevance. The relevance of a
particular characteristic is ordinarily a legislative judgment except where, for
whatever reasons, we do not trust the legislature to determine relevance impar-
tially. The Court does not, for example, question a state university's use of
such arguably irrelevant admissions factors as athletic ability or the wealth or
alumni status of the applicant's parents.13 1 In fact, the Court tends not to rely
on the irrelevance of a characteristic as a justification for heightened scrutiny
unless it has reason to believe that the legislature's use of the characteristic is
motivated or influenced by class-based animus. For example, in Clements v.
Fashing 32 the Court upheld a limitation on the ability of certain state and
county officials to run for other elective offices without resigning their present
posts, despite the apparent lack of any relevant difference between them and
other local officials not subject to the resignation requirement. Justice Rehn-
quist, in a part of his opinion joined by three other Justices, suggested that
such a distinction among different office-holders, "absent an insidious purpose,
is not the sort of malfunctioning of the State's lawmaking process forbidden by
the Equal Protection Clause."' 133 Moreover, any discussion of irrelevance as a
reason for heightened scrutiny that fails to advert to the likelihood of class-
based animus does not provide a sufficient nexus to the central basis for
heightened scrutiny: the suspicion of legislative motives. To maintain this
nexus, the irrelevance of the characteristic may only be used, in conjunction
with a history of hostile use of the same characteristic, to suggest that the legis-
lature's prejudice is interfering with its judgment. Again, it is the process
rather than the result that is suspect. This leads back to a class-based analysis
that focuses on the Court's best guess as to the general ability of the class to
participate in or influence the legislative process-including its ability to com-
129. Id at 39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
130. Id at 41-42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634, 658-61 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
131. See Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 404 (1978) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); cf Ely, supra note 94,
at 730-31 (irrelevance alone, without history of legal disadvantage, not enough to evoke strict scrutiny
of racial classifications).
132. 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
133. Id at 971. Cf. United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180-81 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("adverse impact on disfavored class" suspect if apparent aim of legislature,
but not if necessary cost of achieving larger goal); UJO v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977) (redistricting
plan based on race to facilitate election of nonwhite representatives did not violate equal protection
because it "represented no racial slur or stigma"); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1969)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (ordinance invalid because of invidious purpose to reduce minorities' ability to
achieve antidiscrimination legislation).
[Vol. 73:89
HeinOnline  -- 73 Geo. L. J. 112 1984-1985
EQUAL PROTECTION
bat prejudice and hostility. Thus a more careful examination of the relevance
factor supports a class-based analysis.
4. Immutability
Finally, the Court often focuses on whether the characteristic is immutable,
or whether the individual can or should be held responsible for possessing the
characteristic. The Court has often stated that classification schemes based on
factors over which the individual has no control are "contrary to the basic
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to indi-
vidual responsibility or wrongdoing." 134 The lack of individual responsibility
pertains to all aspects of a distinguishing characteristic-neither blacks nor
whites can alter their race-and this suggests a classification-based analysis.
As with the relevance factor, however, any detailed discussion of immutabil-
ity raises questions about why heightened scrutiny is applied to classifications
based on immutable characteristics. The explanation that it is unfair to disad-
vantage someone for a characteristic for which he or she is not responsible is
too simplistic because it does not explain our willingness to distribute benefits
and burdens on the basis of such morally arbitrary characteristics as intelli-
gence or physical ability.135 Moreover, in at least one context, the Court has
rejected the argument that penalizing an individual for a voluntary character-
istic is an appropriate method of inducing change: discrimination against
aliens who are eligible for citizenship but choose not to become citizens is no
less suspect than discrimination against ineligible aliens, even though an eligi-
ble alien chooses his or her status. 136 Finally, classifications based on immuta-
ble characteristics are not forbidden, merely subject to heightened scrutiny. 137
A more persuasive explanation for the importance of immutability may be
134. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972); accordPickett v. Brown, 103
S. Ct. 2199, 2204 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Re-
gents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360-61 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.); San Antonio Indep. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 108-09 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 551
n.19 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 243 (1944); see also
Modern Equal Protection, supra note 94, at 1065.
135. See J. ELY, supra note 10, at 150 (intelligence and physical characteristics typically accepted as
legitimate bases for classification even by those who argue immutable bases suspect); Shiffrin, supra
note 34, at 1163 (although equality of opportunity guaranteed for access to positions, selection based on
morally arbitrary features such as comparative talent); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1073 n.51 (1980) (intelligence, height, strength all immuta-
ble but not unconstitutional bases for classification). While superior intelligence is usually given as a
reason to distribute benefits, it can also be used to impose burdens. At least one court has upheld a
landlord's refusal to rent to a woman whom he felt might give him trouble because of her intelligence.
Kramarsky v. Stahl Management, 92 Misc. 2d 1030, 1032 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
136. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n.l 1 (1977) ("element of voluntariness in. . . reten-
tion of alien status" does not dilute propriety of strict scrutiny). In Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976), which upheld a federal classification of aliens based on the length of their residency in the
United States, the Court (in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Stevens) focused not on the charac-
teristic but rather on the attributes of members of the class: "Citizens and those who are most like
citizens qualify [for the benefits]. Those who are less like citizens do not." Id at 83. Cf. In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973) (invalidating discrimination against aliens by stressing similarities between
citizens and aliens).
137. See Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 355-56 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (equal protection
clause permits classification based on race when justified by "overriding statutory purpose"); UJO v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 161 (1977) (no per se rule against using race as classification to achieve black
majority voting districts). Ronald Dworkin makes a similar point in rejecting the allegedly "axiomatic"
proposition "that any legal distinction based on race is offensive to democracy":
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derived from Ely's suggestion that suspect classifications are those based on "a
comparison between a 'we' stereotype and a 'they' stereotype .... "138 The
immutability of an identifying characteristic assures legislators that the "we"
group (including the legislators) can never be subject to a statute disadvantag-
ing the "they" group,' 39 and thus allows hostility, insensitivity, or mere indif-
ference full play, untempered by the normal reluctance to disadvantage a
group to which the legislators know they may eventually belong.140 Immuta-
bility thus is important as a factor justifying heightened scrutiny primarily be-
cause the stability inherent in an immutable characteristic facilitates the
operation of class-based animus. 141
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF CLASS-BASED ANALYSIS
A. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS
1. Affirmative Action
The implications for affirmative action of adopting a class-based analysis are
very clear. Legislative schemes discriminating against a nondisfavored class
(affirmative action quotas, for example) would ordinarily not be subject to
Legislation based on racial prejudice is unconstitutional not because any distinction using
race is immoral but because any legislation that can be justified only by appealing to the
majority's preferences about which of their fellow citizens are worthy of concern and respect,
or what sorts of lives their fellow citizens should lead, denies equality.
Dworkin, The Forum of Princoile, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 513, 514-15 (1981).
138. Ely, supra note 59, at 920, 933 n.35; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 94, at 1053 n.5.
139. Pregnancy regulation provides an illustration of how this reassurance functions to allow unex-
amined passage of laws affecting the rights of only one class. Predominantly male legislators, secure in
the knowledge that they can never become pregnant, are likely to be less concerned about restricting the
choices available to pregnant women.
140. For example, classifications disadvantaging the elderly are, correctly, not subject to strict scru-
tiny, at least in part because most legislators and voters will someday be old. Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.S. 93, 113-14 n.l (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Ely, supra note 94, at 723, 733 n.43; Streib, Are
the Aged a Minority Group, in MIDDLE AGE AND AGING 35 (B. Neugarten ed. 1968); but see LEVINE,
AGEISM 69 (1980); Barron, Minority Group Characteristics of theAged in American Society, 8 J. GERON-
TOLOGY 477 (1953). Cf. Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1983) (individuals between 18 and
45 not a suspect class).
141. The theory I have just described is a natural extension of the American rejection of the English
concept of "virtual representation." In England, the intimate connection between those who elected
members of Parliament and those who did not guaranteed that the latter could not be unduly disadvan-
taged without harm befalling the former as well. Since the interests of the American colonists were not
so intimately related to those of the English electors, however, the colonists refused to accept "virtual"
representation as a substitute for actual representation. B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 167-68 (1967); J. ELY, supra note 10, at 82-83. Judicially created limitations
on state power to regulate interstate commerce also recognize the principle that legislative power can-
not extend beyond those actually represented in the legislative body. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68 n.2 (1945) (impact of legislation on interests outside the state unlikely to
influence state legislative processes); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435-36 (1819)
(state lacks power to impose tax on persons not represented in state legislature).
This mistrust of an unrepresentative and therefore potentially ill-motivated legislature also is re-
flected in the ultimate American rejection of Locke's doctrine of natural political virtue. As one scholar
summarized it, that doctrine is based on the belief that "a majority, which is simply a random sample of
those who voted, will ... tend to act with some responsibility toward those in the minority." P. LAS-
LETT, INTRODUCTION TO J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 109 (1967). When, as with clas-
sifications based on immutable characteristics, the interests of the legislators and of their disfavored
constituents become more and more divergent, the bankruptcy of both the "virtual representation" and
"majority responsibility" theories leads one to question the ability of a democratic polity to respond to
the problems of a perpetual minority.
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heightened scrutiny at all. The only exception to this rule is that if a statute
superficially benefiting a disfavored class actually disadvantaged or stigma-
tized that class, heightened scrutiny would be invoked. Heightened scrutiny
would be appropriate, however, not because of the classification but because of
the identity of the class actually disadvantaged by the statute. Thus, while
reverse racial classifications would not ordinarily be subject to heightened
scrutiny, plaintiffs would be given an opportunity to demonstrate any negative
effects on the minority class. If such effects were demonstrated, heightened
scrutiny would become appropriate.142
Examples of reverse classifications that involve a disadvantage to the super-
ficially benefited class might include the statutory rape law at issue in Michael
M v. Superior Court'43 and the differential drinking age invalidated in Craig v.
Boren. 44 In both cases, the statutes reflected and perpetuated negative stereo-
types of women that contributed to their subordinate position in society. It is
important to differentiate between negative stereotypes based on inherent
characteristics of the class and negative stereotypes based on the relative posi-
tion of the class in society. A stereotype based on an inherent characteristic-
"women are passive"-suggests the sort of prejudice that heightened scrutiny
is designed to identify and forbid. A stereotype based on societal status-
"blacks are societally disadvantaged"-does not stigmatize the object of the
generalization as inherently inferior and thus is not evidence of prejudice.
Consequently, statutes that reflect a belief that a disfavored class needs assist-
ance in overcoming societally-created hurdles are not detrimental to the class;
statutes reflecting a belief that a disfavored class needs assistance or protection
from its own inherent limitations are detrimental to the class. 145 The burden,
however, ought to be on the challenger to show that the statute reflects a stere-
142. Under what appears to be the new mode of bifurcated standing analysis, see Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1676 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (characterizing majority opinion as hold-
ing that standing to seek injunctive relief must be analyzed separately from standing to seek damages),
a white plaintiffs attempt to show that an affirmative action program had negative effects on the minor-
ity class might raise intriguing standing questions. Since a minority member would clearly have stand-
ing, however, even the denial of standing to the white plaintiff would not preclude review of the
program.
143. 450 U.S. 464 (1981). Justice Brennan suggested that the statute reflected and perpetuated out-
moded sexual stereotypes. Id at 495-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A 1964 California Supreme Court
decision had justified the law on the ground that a young woman
is presumed too innocent and naive to understand the implications and nature of her act ...
The law's concern with her capacity or lack thereof to understand is explained in part by a
popular conception of the social, moral and personal values which are preserved by the absti-
nence from sexual indulgence on the part of a young woman.
Id at 495-96 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d. 529, 531, 393 P.2d
673, 674, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 362 (1964)).
144. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Appellants in that case argued that the statute's acceptance of an earlier
age of majority for women was probably "derived from Victorian and frontier notions of 'naturally'
and/or 'divinely' mandated and stereotyped sex roles," including "a sentiment that the male ought to
be the breadwinner of the family" and therefore needed 21 years of parental support before he could
"successful[ly] discharge" this responsibility. Brief for Appellants at 5-6, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Ginsburg, supra note 121, at 145 (Craig statute "rested on a familiar stereotype: the active boy,
aggressive and assertive; the passive girl, docile and submissive"); see also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S.
7 (1975) (statute fixing lower age for termination of child support for females as opposed to males
unconstitutional because based on "old notionfl" that man needs more education and training).
145. See Modern Equal Protection, supra note 94, at 1043-50 (1979) (racial preference constitutional
when based on "sociohistorical status," not moral superiority, of one race).
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otype about inherent rather than societally-based characteristics. This would
be an easy hurdle to overcome in such cases as Craig and Michael M, but
would be quite difficult in the case of programs specifically designed to com-
pensate for prior discrimination.
This scheme leaves with the legislature, in the first instance, the decision
whether or not to adopt compensatory reverse classifications and the choice of
which groups to include. 146 A failure to adopt any affirmative action program
at all is not subject to heightened scrutiny or any other kind of scrutiny be-
cause it is not governmental action.147 Moreover, under this analysis, a legisla-
tive decision to establish an affirmative action program for blacks but not for
Hispanics would not be subject to heightened scrutiny unless a Hispanic plain-
tiff could show (1) that she was a member of a disfavored class and (2) that the
legislative decision left her worse off than if no affirmative action program had
been adopted at all. In the context of a medical school admissions program,
for example, this second requirement might be satisfied by a Hispanic plain-
tiftf's showing that she would have been admitted under the normal standards
had not a black with lesser credentials been given preferential treatment. In
other words, only a member of a disfavored class actually harmed by the legis-
lative favoring of another class could argue that the governmental decision to
close the category of affirmative action applicants to her class constituted class-
based discrimination.
Other commentators have defended affirmative action on various constitu-
tional grounds, but none has questioned the initial applicability of heightened
scrutiny to racial or gender-based classifications. Instead, they have argued
that some type of exception to heightened scrutiny should be carved out for
reverse or benign suspect classifications. 148 A major difficulty with this ap-
146. See Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 805-08.
147. A failure to adopt an affirmative action program might, under some circumstances, be subject to
heightened scrutiny under the disparate impact strand of class-based analysis. See infra notes 152 to
154 and accompanying text (discussing disparate impact issue).
148. For example, Kenneth Karst and Harold Horowitz have defended affirmative action by arguing
that it satisfies the "compelling state interest" requirement imposed on suspect classifications. Karst &
Horowitz, supra note 33, at 965-66; see also citations collected at Ely, supra note 94, at 726 & n.23. This
approach is particularly vulnerable to abuse insofar as the "compelling state interest" test, to retain its
vitality, must remain rigid and difficult to manipulate.
John Ely has argued, simply, that a classification scheme by which a majority disadvantages itself is
not suspect. Ely, supra note 94, at 723. While his conclusion is based on some of the same premises as
is my argument that the Court ought to focus on classes rather than classifications, it does not ade-
quately avoid the appearance of result-oriented partiality towards minorities, nor is it sufficiently tied to
constitutional principles.
Michael Perry argues that because affirmative action is not based on the premise that whites are "by
virtue of race morally inferior to . . . nonwhites" and because the preferential treatment accorded
nonwhites is based on the morally relevant factor "sociohistorical status," at least some affirmative
action programs are constitutional. Modern Equal Protection, supra note 94, at 1043-50. Perry's ap-
proach is useful because it points in the right direction: by pinpointing sociohistorical status as the
relevant factor he implicitly indicates that the focus should be on the attributes of the class members
and not solely on the distinguishing characteristic. Like Ely, however, Perry fails to justify this selective
judicial activism on other than pragmatic grounds.
Owen Fiss has undertaken the most elaborate theoretical defense of both affirmative action and
disparate impact analysis. Fiss, supra note 11. Fiss argues that a better guide for applying the equal
protection clause is a "group-disadvantaging principle" rather than an antidiscrimination principle.
His primary justification for the former principle, however, seems to be that it achieves the desired
results, rather than that it is constitutionally required. See il at 170-72 (discussing different result
produced by group-disadvantaging rather than antidiscrimination principle). His approach thus is sub-
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proach is the lack of a coherent and principled method of confining it. As
Kenneth Karst has noted:
The concern is that if we validate a racial preference for this purpose,
we cannot be sure where such a validation will lead. Just as the idea
of equality is "not easily cabined," it may also be difficult to find
principled limits to the validity of race as a legislative
classification.14 9
A class-based explanation for heightened scrutiny avoids the appearance of
creating an exemption for some kinds of race discrimination.15 0 Moreover,
any approach that seeks to justify affirmative action by explaining why estab-
ject to the criticisms that have been leveled at all substance theorists. See supra notes 55 to 83 and
accompanying text (criticizing substance model). Fiss also fails to explain adequately the role of height-
ened scrutiny in his scheme, although he appears to recognize its usefulness. Fiss, supra note 11, at 167
(comparing group-disadvantaging principle to heightened scrutiny).
149. Karst & Horowitz, supra note 33, at 973 (footnote omitted). Alexander Bickel made the argu-
ment first: "So also one must view as a device of expediency a 'principle' that race is a proscribed
ground of legislative classification, except that it may be used sometimes." A. BICKEL, supra note 59, at
59; see also A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975) (reverse discrimination turns evalua-
tion of racial classifications into "a matter of whose ox is gored").
150. It may be argued that confining heightened scrutiny to disfavored classes rather than disfavored
classifications is vulnerable to the same charge of judicial manipulation and inconsistency as the theo-
ries discussed supra in note 148. The Court's doctrine of suspect classifications is itself a judicial inven-
tion, however, designed to make logical and practical sense out of an almost limitless clause. See Fiss,
supra note 11, at 108 (words of equal protection clause "do not state an intelligible rule of decision").
As Justice Rehnquist has noted, "the crux of the problem is whether persons are similarly situated for
the purposes of the state action in issue. Nothing in the words of the Fourteenth Amendment specifi-
cally addresses this question in any way." Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 780 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); see also Greenwalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1169,
1178 (1983) (in absence of substantive criteria, principle of equality provides no guidance as to how
people should be treated); Karst & Horowitz, supra note 33, at 957 ("judges . . . classify when they
define the issues of equality"); Principle of Equal Protection, supra note 94, at 1133, 1136 (equality
"vacuous notion" until we define particular principles defining particular legally protected equalities).
An example of conflicting definitions of equality may be found in a comparison between the traditional
belief that truly equal treatment satisfies an equality requirement and Catherine MacKinnon's position
that gender equality may in fact require unequaltreatment: 'To feminism, equality means the eradica-
tion not of gender differentiation but of gender hierarchy." C. MacKinnon, The Future of Women's
Rights 2 (Mar. 16, 1982) (unpublished debate with Phyllis Schlafly, Stanford Law School); see also C.
MacKinnon, Women as Women in Law: On Exceptionality 3 (Oct. 4, 1982) (unpublished address at
University of Minnesota Law School); cf. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (opinion of Black-
mun, J.) ("In order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently"). In other words, The
Slaughterhouse Cases Court's vision of equal protection, the Carolene Products/Ely vision of equal
protection, and the MacKinnon vision of equal protection are different conceptions of the concept of
equal protection. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 33, at 134-37 (distinguishing underlying general "con-
cept" from more specific "conceptions"); see also G. CALABRESI & R. BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICES 24-
25 (1978) (advocating equal treatment of "people who [are] relevantly equal," and discriminating
among those who are "relevantly unequal").
If one recognizes the inevitability of some judicial discretion in delineating proscribed classifications,
but see R. BERGER, supra note 1 (limited purposes of fourteenth amendment are clear and should be
binding on the Court), then the well-established doctrine of suspect classifications affords a good start-
ing place for further refinements. The difference between the theory suggested in this Article and those
discussed supra in note 148 is that while the latter take the doctrine of suspect classifications at face
value and attempt to find a way around the doctrine's obvious disfavor of benign discrimination, the
former approaches the question earlier in the chain of argument, realigning the doctrine of suspect
classifications so that it is more internally consistent. Such a theory of equal protection is thus superior
insofar as it offers, within the parameters of acceptable conceptions of equal protection, a more useful,
practical tool in avoiding the dangers of both the Court's present approach and the approaches sug-
gested by Ely and other commentators. Cf Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact andIllicit Motive: The-
ories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 36, 62 (1977) ("[T]he true test of any equalprotection theory is not whether its ideal of equality is superior in the abstract; it is first, whether the
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lished rules of law should not apply to it is vulnerable as a practical matter
insofar as it fails to advance any positive position. It is always less persuasive
to refute one's opponents by negating their premises than by advancing one's
own.151
2. Disparate Impact
An equally important effect of a class-based analysis is to switch the focus of
debate from the language of a statute to its impact. The logical differences
between classification and class suggest that while a challenge on the basis of
the former is essentially a technical matter-the elimination of all statutes con-
taining the offensive words that classify-the latter is more concerned with
what the statute does than with what it says. Thus, if heightened scrutiny
means that the Court displays solicitude for the class affected by a statute,
rather than intolerance for the classification on which the statute is based, the
Court is freer-perhaps obligated-to consider the disparate impact of a
facially neutral statute. 52 Other commentators have recognized the inherent
practical problems with extending heightened scrutiny to all statutes which re-
sult in disparate impact and have suggested various limitations. For instance,
heightened scrutiny might be applied only where the disparate impact is the
direct result of prior discrimination,153 or a standard lower than heightened
scrutiny but higher than mere rational basis might be applied.' 54
None of these suggestions can coherently be implemented until it is first
explained why a neutral statute with a disparate impact is the sort of discrimi-
nation that justifies heightened scrutiny in the first place. An analysis based on
class provides this explanation within the framework of the process model.
This Article argues that heightened scrutiny is justifiable only in the context of
an actual disadvantageous effect on a disfavored class. This has both a nar-
rowing and a broadening effect on the application of heightened scrutiny.
theory provides an acceptable view of the idea of equality and second, whether in practice the theory
constitutes an improvement over other mediating principles").
151. Cf. Rhode, Equal Rights in Retrospect, 1 J.L. & INEQUALITY 1, 15-16 (1983) (same argument
made in context of explaining political failure of Equal Rights Amendment).
152. The Court has categorically refused to subject neutral statutes with a disparate impact on mi-
norities to heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62-63, 66-70 (1980); Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). An earlier Court was
less harsh, see Hunter v. Erikson, 393 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1969) (unconstitutionality of charter amend-
ment making it more difficult to pass fair housing ordinances); but see Washington v. Seattle School
Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467-87 (1982) (interpreting Hunter as not involving disparate impact), and
some commentators still contend that disparate impact theory should be an essential part of equal
protection law. See Eisenberg, supra note 150, at 36 (proposing heightened scrutiny on basis of impact);
Modern Equal Protection, supra note 94, at 1039-40 (same).
153. See Eisenberg, supra note 150, at 36 (suggesting "causation principle" encompassing causation
in fact and proximate cause); Perry, supra note 13, at 540 (suggesting focus on "disproportionate racial
impact" related to prior discrimination); cf. Schnapper, CiviRightsLitigation AfterMonell, 79 COLUM.
L. REv. 213, 238-39 (1979) (advocating analogous principle under § 1983).
154. See Modem Equal Protection, supra note 94, at 559-61 (disproportionate impact test between
strict scrutiny and rational relationship test); cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (creat-
ing intermediate standard under Title VII); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977)
(intermediate scrutiny for disparate impact under Title VIII), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); United
States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974) (balancing test for disparate impact
under Title VIII), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Comment, Justifying a Discriminatory Effect Under
the Fair Housing Act: A Searchfor the Proper Standar4 27 UCLA L. REv. 398 (1979) (same).
[Vol. 73:89
HeinOnline  -- 73 Geo. L. J. 118 1984-1985
EQUAL PROTECTION
First, as suggested in the discussion of affirmative action, heightened scrutiny
is narrowed to focus only on those actions disadvantaging a minority. Second,
when the triggering mechanism is shifted from whether a statute classifies on
the basis of race to whether it disadvantages one particular race, a neutral
statute with a disproportionately negative impact on a minority meets the trig-
gering criterion. It is the recognition that, even under a process model, the
Court ought to be concerned with classes, not with classifications, that works
these changes.
B. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF MOTIVATION THEORY
The role of motivation in the foregoing analysis is peculiar but crucial. Mo-
tivation provides the essential link between the analysis suggested here and
process theory (and thus to the Constitution). It forms the overriding frame-
work within which each factor must be understood, and yet motivation itself is
irrelevant to the final result. An accurate assessment of the role of motivation
should lead process theorists to the same result as that reached by substance
theorists: when a disfavored class is disadvantaged, it is the result, not the
intent, that counts.155
This transformation of the role of motivation is unsurprising if process the-
ory is deconstructed to expose its underlying concerns. The process theorist's
attention to motivation is a recognition that the legislative process should be
permitted to lead to "unfair" results only if those results arise from a proper
operation of the process, rather than from bias. The role of bias in the legisla-
tive process, however, cannot be as narrowly defined as is implied by the
phrase "legislative motive." The societal bias against a discrete and insular
minority inevitably informs, and distorts, the judgment of legislators-who
are, after all, members of the society. Thus the question of legislative motiva-
tion is a question of societal discrimination, and judicial intervention is war-
ranted whenever the disadvantaged class is one whose voice cannot be heard
by the legislature.1 56
155. Many process theorists, because they do not examine the purposes of strict scrutiny, fail to
recognize that the purportedly race-neutral demand for procedural regularity implies special judicial
protection for particular classes and thus condemn any "effects" analysis as not within the antidis-
crimination principle. See Blumstein, Defning and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the
Purpose vs. Results Approach From the Voting RightsAct, 69 VA. L. Ray. 633, 634-35 & n.4 (1983) (only
purposefully discriminatory conduct can violate nondiscrimination norm); Ely, supra note 30, at 1254-
60 (suggesting illicit motive in jury selection necessary for heightened judicial review). Owen Fiss
argues that result-oriented analysis ought to replace the antidiscrimination principle, and fails to per-
ceive that the former already follows from the latter. See Fiss, supra note 11, at 107.
156. Naomi Scheman's critique of the "individualist assumption" provides a philosophical basis for
the disappearance of motivation. The "individualist assumption" is that "the objects of psychology-
emotions, beliefs, intentions, virtues, and vices-attach to us singly (no matter how socially we may
acquire them)." Scheman, Individualism and the Objects of Psychology, in DISCOVERING REALITY 225,
226 (S. Harding & M. Hintikka eds. 1983). She rejects this assumption and contends instead that psy-
chological states such as emotions, motives, and beliefs are no more individualistic or atomistic states
than are such clearly relational states as being a major general, being divorced, or being the most
popular girl in the class. She thus suggests that it is incorrect to view "intending to do x" as analogous
to "being five feet tall"; "intending to do x" is rather analogous to "being divorced." Just as it is not
possible to determine whether one is "divorced" without examining the particular legal structure gov-
erning marriage, it is impossible to determine the motives (or emotional states) of legislators without
examining the social structure in which they function.
Scheman argues that the individualist assumption stems from the ideology of liberal individualism.
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There is an identifiable progression from legal realism, through early pro-
cess theory and Ely's more sophisticated process theory, to class-based analy-
sis. If legal realism recognized the subjectivity of all legal decisionmaking,
thus raising novel doubts about motivation, early process theory drew on that
recognition to equate justice with process.1 57 One substantial flaw in early pro-
cess theory is the ease with which procedures may be manipulated by any ill-
motivated legislator,158 thereby defeating the process theorist's solution to the
legal realist's puzzle. Ely's process theory attempts to remedy this flaw by pin-
pointing the general circumstances under which legislative motivation may be
suspect. There is an inherent limitation in Ely's theory, however. The central-
ity of motivation to the theory necessarily suggests that "pure" motives, how-
ever they are to be demonstrated, can justify even suspicious legislative action.
Thus Ely must reject strict scrutiny of neutral laws that cannot be shown to be
improperly motivated, even though such laws have a disproportionate impact
on minorities. The only exception to this posture is where the impact is so
substantial as to suggest the likelihood of illicit motivation. 159 This Article's
progression to a class-based analysis demonstrates that Ely's requirement of
improper motivation is an artificial one, derived from a misunderstanding of
the justifications for selective judicial activism.
C. APPLICATION
The class-based analysis suggested in this Article should prove no more dif-
ficult to apply than the classification-based analysis the Court currently uses in
many race and gender cases. The factors currently relied on by the Court to
She contends that our ordinary attribution of psychological states such as "motivation" to atomistic
individuals is based on liberalism's inability to recognize the intersubjectivity of human beings.
Michael Sandel defines intersubjective conceptions of human beings as those which "allow that in
certain moral circumstances, the relevant description of self may embrace more than a single, individu-
ated human being." M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JusTicE 62 (1982). An intersubjec-
tive conception of the human self thus allows us to understand that the motives of an individual
legislator are not distinct from the beliefs and intentions of other members of the society.
157. See generally G.E. WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 136-50 (1978); Nowak,
Resurrecting Realist Jurisprudence:- The Political Bias qfBurger Court Justices, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv.
549, 554-60 (1983); Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law
Scholarshi in the Seventies, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1307, 1314-15 (1979); White, The Inevitability of Critical
Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 649, 661-63 (1984).
158. For a paradigmatic example of such manipulation, see White, supra note 157, at 663-64:
Suppose that the [tenure] candidate is first evaluated by a faculty subcommittee whose mem-
bers, for their own political and personal reasons, have resolved to deny him tenure. Indeed
the committee members are quite explicit about this decision: They openly discuss how best
to accomplish their aim. They resolve to critique his scholarship and teaching in such a way
as to suggest that he falls below acceptable standards for tenure "on the merits." Their evalu-
ation of the candidate is tainted by their a priori decision to recommend against tenure: They
manipulate evidence about his teaching, supply criticism of the candidate's scholarship that
gives it no credit for its positive contributions, dismiss favorable outside commentary on the
candidate from other faculty members that are not comments on his teaching and scholarship
but comments on his personality and lifestyle. They then solemnly announce that, after a full
evaluation of the candidate's scholarship, teaching, and service to the institution, they have
concluded that the candidate fails to meet tenure standards.
White plausibly concludes that this would, in ordinary cases, be deemed compliance with proper proce-
dures, at least if the committee's motivation was not uncovered.
159. See Ely, supra note 30, at 1254-60 (unless statistical evidence overwhelming, convincing evi-
dence of random selection will rebut inference of improper motive from statistical disparity).
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determine whether a classification is suspect in fact depend on the status of a
particular class, 160 and thus are perfectly suited to class-based analysis. In ad-
dition to the four specific factors discussed above, 161 "traditional indicia of
suspectness"' 162 include such things as continuing widespread poverty status,
confinement to particular roles or jobs, and segregated residential patterns. 163
The paradigmatic case of blacks can serve as a model of a suspect class as well
as of a suspect classification.
A few examples, already considered by various members of the Court, may
illustrate. As Justice Brennan and Justice Rehnquist have argued, neither
whites nor males meet the criteria for disfavored class status.' 64 The Court
already considers the question whether to treat as suspect or disfavored such
groups as illegal aliens, the handicapped, or the poor within the framework of
class-based rather than classification-based analysis. 165 National origin groups
also raise few problems. The Court has implicitly recognized that Hispanic-
Americans still face sufficient pervasive discrimination to be considered a dis-
favored class. 166 Asian-Americans also should be considered a disfavored class
on the basis of income level, segregated residential patterns, and discrimina-
tory treatment. 67
There is one group with a unique status in American society: American
Jews. For Jews, application of the class-based analysis is both difficult and
troubling. Under a classification-based analysis, religion may be seen as
analogous to race or national origin and thus treated as a suspect characteris-
160. See supra notes 111 to 116 and accompanying text (discussing cases deciding whether legislation
disadvantaging particular group required strict scrutiny).
161. See supra text accompanying note 110 (discussing Court's use of factors to determine height-
ened scrutiny).
162. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
163. See, e.g., DAvis, MINORITY-DOMINANT RELATIONS 4, 27-30 (1978); MacKinnon, Excerpisfrom
MacKinnon/Schlafly Debate, 1 J. L. & INEQUALITY 341, 350 (1983); Wirth, supra note 125, at 347 (mi-
norities barred from many socioeconomic opportunities, often geographically segregated, and restricted
in occupational advancement).
164. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981) (plurality opinion of Rehn-
quist, J.) (nothing suggests that men need special protection from the courts); Regents v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (whites as class have no traditional indicia of disfavored
class); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 219 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (males aged 18 to 20 not
peculiarly disadvantaged).
165. See supra notes 96 to 110 and accompanying text (discussing court determinations of suspect
classifications).
166. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479-80 (1954) (recognizing Hispanics in Jackson County,
Texas as class deserving of fourteenth amendment protection). Hispanic-Americans exhibit the same
indicia of historic and continuing discrimination as do blacks: they tend to be clustered at the low end
of the economic scale, in low-paying and low-prestige occupations, and in poor, ghetto neighborhoods.
See also Jencks, Discrimination and Thomas Sowell, N. Y. Rev. of Books, Mar. 3, 1983, at 34 (Hispanics
at bottom of income scale); Lusky, supra note 108, at 1095, 1105 n.72 (Chicanos sizable ethnic group
held at arm's length by dominant social groups in United States); Mujica, Bilingualism's Goal, N. Y.
Times, Feb. 26, 1984, at E17; Romero, Chicanos and Occupational Mobility, in MINORITIES IN THE
LABOR MARKET 66 (P. Bullock ed. 1977) (Chicanos remain concentrated in unskilled and semiskilled
occupations).
167. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235-40 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting)
(describing military's rationale for incarceration of Japanese-Americans as based on "misinformation,
half-truths, and insinuations"); G.E. WHITE, supra note 60, at 69-70 (Japanese-Americans "generally
barred from entry into non-Japanese communities"); Cabezas, Evidence for the Low Mobility of Asian
Americans in the Labor Market, in MINORITIES IN THE LABOR MARKET, supra note 166, at 39 (Asians
continue to earn less than mean income of whites); Kim & Kim, Asian Immigrants in American Law, 26
AM. U. L. REv. 373, 404 (1977) (Asian immigrants typically unemployed or under-employed).
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tic.' 68 The class-based theory suggested in this Article, however, requires a
more detailed examination of the Jewish experience in the United States. Such
an examination serves as both an example of how to apply the class-based
analysis, and a concrete illustration of the theoretical foundations of that
analysis.
Jews have suffered, and to some extent still suffer, from pervasive societal
discrimination. 169 Much of this discrimination is based on negative stereo-
types. 170 Despite discrimination, however, Jews have achieved a measure of
political, economic, and social success unequaled by blacks or Hispanics.' 7 '
The concerns engendered by earlier discrimination have surfaced, however, in
the new affirmative action controversy: Jews, traditionally liberal politi-
cally,172 have begun to oppose the "liberal" remedy of affirmative action out of
fear that quotas cannot be restricted to benign uses. 173
Application of the Court's criteria of suspectness yields an ambiguous an-
swer to the question whether Jews are a disfavored class. The criterion of soci-
etal relevance is difficult to assess in the case of American Jews. Many Jews
perceive themselves as dependent upon their children to preserve their culture
and traditions. Assimilation, the goal of many other ethnic groups, is often
actively discouraged.' 74 The desire of many Jews to preserve cultural differ-
ences may make application of the irrelevance factor turn on an impossible
case-by-case analysis. It is only the immutability factor that unequivocally in-
dicates that Jews are a disfavored class. Jews are often perceived to be identifi-
168. Religious discrimination also may be treated as a violation of the religion clauses. However,
claims of discrimination against Jews (as well as other non-Christians) have not fared well in the courts
under the religion clauses. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (city-erected Christmas dis-
play not violation of establishment clause); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding law
prohibiting retail sale of certain goods on Sundays as applied to Orthodox Jews).
169. See generally N. BELTH, A PROMISE TO KEEP: A NARRATIVE OF THE AMERICAN ENCOUNTER
WITH ANTI-SEMITISM (1979); N. BELTH, BARRIERS: PATTERNS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST JEws
(1958); H. QUINLEY & C. GLOCK, ANTI-SEMITISM IN AMERICA (1979); G. SELZNICK & S. STEINBERG,
THE TENACITY OF PREJUDICE: ANTI-SEMITISM IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1969).
170. See H. QUINLEY & C. GLOCK, supra note 169, at 2-5 (discussing stereotypes of Jews); G. SELZ-
NICK & S. STEINBERG, supra note 169, at 6-16 (same).
171. See generally N. GLAZER & D. MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT 143-44 (1963) (Jewish
incomes generally exceed those of non-Jews); Goldstein, American Jewry 1970. 4 Demographic Profile,
in THE JEW IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 97, 154-58 (M. Sklare ed. 1974) (median income of Jews well above
population as a whole); I. HOWE, WORLD OF OUR FATHERS: THE JOURNEY OF THE EAST EUROPEAN
JEWS TO AMERICA AND THE LIFE THEY FOUND AND MADE 609-11 (1976) (Jews disproportionately
represented among professional and technical occupations in American society).
172. See N. GLAZER & D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 171, at 166-71.
173. See Brief of Queens Jewish Community Council and the Jewish Rights Council as Amici Cu-
riae; Brief of Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Jewish Labor Committee, National Jewish Com-
mission on Law and Public Affairs, et al. as Amici Curiae; Brief of American Jewish Committee,
American Jewish Congress, et al. as Amici Curiae, Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
174. See N. GLAZER, AMERICAN JUDAISM 181-84 (2d ed. 1972) (ethnic loyalty has become increas-
ingly significant component of Judaism); N. GLAZER & D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 17 1, at 160-61 (group
social pressure against marriage with non-Jews); Himmelfarb, Research on American Jewish Identity
andIdentflcation, in UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN JEWRY 56, 62 (M. Sklare ed. 1982) (American Jews
tend not to assimilate); I. HOWE, supra note 171, at 613, 617-18, 641 (Jews who moved to suburbs kept
persistent attachment to Jewish identity); Schwartz, Intermarriage in the United States, in THE JEW IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 171, at 307, 307-08 (many rabbis reluctant to accept intermarriage); M.
SKLARE, JEWISH IDENTITY ON THE SUBURBAN FRONTIER 291-97 (1967) (Jewish children who assimi-
late generally do so against wishes of parents).
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able, by both surname and physiognomy, as a distinct group.' 75 Individual
Jews may choose not to practice their religion, but that choice does not protect
them from anti-Semitism; Jewishness thus is effectively immutable.
The issue is complicated by the fact that direct legislative discrimination
against Jews is rare or nonexistent.' 76 Most legislation that disadvantages Jews
does so through a disparate impact and is often the result of apathy or igno-
rance rather than hostility. A paradigmatic example of such discrimination
may be found in the myriad instances of official approval of Christian religious
observances, from the singing of Christmas carols in schools to the existence of
several national holidays commemorating Christian festivals. 177
For Jews, the class-based analysis' focus on motivation and process de-
mands a more sharply defined approach. Whether to accord this group disfa-
vored class status must turn, in each case, on the decisionmaking body and the
context of the decision. If, for example, a discriminatory decision is made by a
political body in which Jews are underrepresented in proportion to their repre-
sentation in the affected community, heightened scrutiny would be appropriate
on the grounds that the decision is likely to be the result of nonparticipation,
prejudice, or indifference-the existence of which is suggested by the fact of
underrepresentation in conjunction with the other criteria already discussed.
Moreover, even if the group is proportionately represented in the decisionmak-
ing body, the continued existence of private prejudice creates a likelihood that,
in certain contexts, prejudice has interfered with the individual decisionmak-
ing process. The enactment of discriminatory legislation in this context sug-
gests that prejudice may have influenced non-Jewish legislators to outvote
their Jewish colleagues.
Consider two hypothetical statutes passed by a municipality in which Jews
are proportionately represented in the governing body. The first is a statute
allowing a tuition tax credit to parents of private school students.'78 It is plau-
sible to argue that such an enactment should not be subject to heightened scru-
tiny. Despite the possibility that such a tax credit might have a
disproportionately negative impact on Jews, the context of the legislation (aca-
demics and education) is one in which Jews are successful, and perhaps even
175. Jews are frequently described as a "race." Auerbach, Legal Education and Some of Its Discon-
tents, 34 J. LEGAL EDuC. 43, 49 (1984).
176. Direct governmental discrimination against Jews would presumably be prohibited by the first
amendment's establishment clause. But see supra note 168 (discussing historical lack of success in
presenting claims of religious discrimination against Jews). The analysis presented here is independent
of any potential establishment clause violations.
177. For a discussion of non-Jews' indifference to the negative effect such public observances have
on Jews, see H. QUINLEY & C. GLOCK, supra note 169, at 16 (most Americans support singing of
Christmas carols in schools and are unsympathetic to possible Jewish objections); G. SELZNICK & S.
STEINBERG, supra note 169, at 49-50 (same). A classic example of non-Jews' insensitivity to the prob-
lem may be found in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355
(1984). In upholding the public financing and maintenance of a Christmas display including a nativity
scene, Justice O'Connor simultaneously identified the evil with which the establishment clause is con-
cerned as practices that "have the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement...
of religion," id at 1368, and denied that the municipal erection of a creche has that effect. Id at 1369.
The dissent recognized that the city's practice "relegate[s non-Christians] to the status of outsiders." Id
at 1373 n.7 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Fox v. City of
Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 803, 587 P.2d 663, 670, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867, 874 (1978) (Bird, C.J.,
concurring)).
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overrepresented. 179 Imagine, on the other hand, that this same representative
body passes legislation sanctioning the observance of Christian holidays, Such
legislation might be subject to heightened scrutiny under the "discriminatory
context" prong of the proposed analysis because traditional notions of "appro-
priate" religious observances incorporate discrimination. Thus, absent a suffi-
ciently compelling state interest, such legislation would violate the equal
protection clause (regardless of whether it also violated the establishment
clause).
The only recent case in which the Court dealt with legislative action with a
disparate impact on Jews is UJO v. Carey.'80 While a majority of the Court
could not agree on a rationale, eight Justices upheld a New York City redis-
tricting plan that deliberately increased black representation at the expense of
the Hasidic Jewish community. There were three distinct lines of reasoning
used by the various Justices. Justice White found that even the use of "specific
numerical quotas" for black districts was consistent with the equal protection
clause as long as the redistricting plan "represented no racial slur or
stigma,"'18 suggesting that only hostile discrimination triggers heightened
scrutiny. Justice Brennan applied less than heightened scrutiny to the redis-
tricting plan on the grounds that both it and the Voting Rights Act were "cast
in a remedial context with respect to a disadvantaged class,"'182 suggesting that
reverse discrimination does not trigger heightened scrutiny. Finally, Justice
Stewart declined to apply heightened scrutiny on the grounds that the racial
effect of the plan represented only disparate impact and not purposeful dis-
crimination.183 None of these rationales adequately explains both the result in
UJO and the results in other discrimination cases.
Justice White's position is inconsistent with the Court's almost unwavering
refusal to examine or take into account the stigmatizing effects of other in-
stances of reverse discrimination: it is inconsistent with the Bakke Court's re-
jection of nonstigmatizing numerical quotas and it is inconsistent with the
Court's failure to consider the potentially stigmatizing aspects of the statutory
rape provision upheld in MichaelA. Moreover, this approach would presum-
ably validate an attempt to increase Irish-Catholic voting power at the expense
of blacks if it could be shown that the legislature was truly not motivated by
racial animus.
Justice Stewart's position is inconsistent with Gomillion v. Ligh/foo/, 84 as
Justice Burger's dissent points out: "If Gomillion teaches anything, I had
thought it was that drawing of political boundary lines with the sole, explicit
objective of reaching a predetermined racial result cannot ordinarily be
squared with the Constitution."' 85 The conceded motive for New York's re-
179. See Lipset & Ladd, Jewish .4cademics in the United States, in THE JEW IN AMERICAN SOCIETY,
supra note 171, at 259, 261-62 (Jews constitute large portion of academic community); N. GLAZER & D.
MOYNIrAN, supra note 171, at 146 (majority of New York City's teaching force and principals Jewish).
180. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
181. Id at 162, 165 (opinion of White, J.).
182. Id at 170 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
183. Id at 179-80 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
184. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
185. 430 U.S. at 181 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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districting was to create more "'substantial non-white majorities.' "186 Justice
Brennan's approach fails to consider that this is not purely reverse or benign
discrimination: there is a distinctly negative effect on another minority-
Hasidic Jews-and Brennan should have explained why that effect did not
convert the redistricting plan into a Gomillion situation.
In fact, the result in UJO can be explained by combining all three ap-
proaches, and the resulting amalgam fits easily into the analysis suggested in
this Article. State action that uses nonstigmatizing racial classifications
(White) to help rather than harm blacks (Brennan) and that has only a dispa-
rate impact on Jews (Stewart) in a context and a geographic location in which
Jews are well-represented, should not trigger heightened scrutiny. All four ele-
ments-lack of stigma, no harm to a disfavored racial class, only disparate
impact on Jews, and an appropriately nondiscriminatory location and con-
text-are necessary to the finding that heightened scrutiny is not appropriate.
A redistricting plan that disadvantaged blacks (Gomillion), or that stigmatized
blacks as inferior, or that deliberately disadvantaged Jews, or that disadvan-
taged Jews in an area where they were already underrepresented in the legisla-
ture, would trigger heightened scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
This Article is, in one sense, a simple exercise in deconstruction. I have tried
to demonstrate that it is internally inconsistent to limit the implications of pro-
cess theory to a demand for even-handed race-neutral legislation. I have also
offered an alternative vision of the consequences of process theory. It is a vi-
sion that moves process incrementally closer to justice and thus is an attempt
to narrow the widening gap between liberal process theorists and their radical
critics. 187 A process theory of judicial activism is intriguing and persuasive
because it offers both a link to the Constitution and a principled method of
identifying the contexts in which judicial activism is appropriate. The chal-
lenge for process theorists is to develop a middle course to counter the increas-
ing temptation to abandon all attempts at objectivity. 188
186. Id at 152 (opinion of White, J.).
187. See generallyTrillin,A .ReporterAt Large: HaryardLaw, The New Yorker, Mar. 26, 1984, at 53
(noting polarization of Harvard Law School faculty).
188. Failing to possess incontrovertibly sound demonstrative arguments for claims that all
human beings ought to adopt certain rules of conduct and failing to possess a method, or even
a glimmer of a method, for constituting such arguments, it may well seem difficult not to feel
compelled to adopt [a] skeptical attitude ....
Eldridge, On Knowing How To Live: Coleridge's "Frost At Midnight', 8:1 PHIL. & LITERATURE 213,
214 (1984).
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